

# THE INNER SECRETS OF COMMUNISM IN ACTION

by a Man Who Parted the "IRON CURTAIN"

Edmund Stevens is a newspaperman—a train observer and fluent writer. For more than ten years he lived and worked in Soviet Russia and satellite countries. He spoke the language so well that he was often mistaken by Russians for one of their own. He mixed with the people, listened to their loud enthusiasms—and to their whispered complaints. He shared with them their slight pleasures—and shuddered with them at the shadow of the dread Secret Police—the "MVD".

When he returned to America, Stevens brought with him his Russian wife and young son, a sympathy for the Russian people, and an amazing knowledge of the strange and unbelievably powerful government under which they live—and *disappear!*

Mr. Stevens' story is shocking, topical, and vital. It tears apart the cloak of mystery that has long covered the USSR—and objectively reveals *the truth about Communism in action!*

**THIS IS**  
**RUSSIA**  
**IN-CENSORED!**

by  
**EDMUND STEVENS**

Introduction by Gen. Walter Bedell Smith  
(Former U S Ambassador to the Soviet Union)

**COMPLETE AND UNABRIDGED,**



**ETON BOOKS, INC.**

THIS IS RUSSIA—UNCENSORED  
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**COMPLETE AND UNABRIDGED**

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## FOREWORD

YEARS HAVE PASSED since the first book on the Soviet Union by the young correspondent Edmund Stenens appeared in print. There have been years of disillusionment. Gradually the facade of cooperation and common purpose which concealed the long-term policy of our war machine has crumbled and the stark hostility of the Communist-Soviet Government to the Western world has become more apparent. During this period of disillusionment it has been particularly difficult for close range observers of the Soviet scene to retain their objectivity. Here Mr. Stenens has been exceptionally fortunate. Fluent in the language and with an unusual and intelligent Russian wife he possesses a sympathetic knowledge and understanding of the Russian people which few Westerners have attained. Thus he is able to see men and the lives of the Soviet people through the stereotypes of conventional contact and broad international knowledge. The resulting images are reflected in this book with unusual accuracy and depth.

*G. B. Smith*



## DEPARTURE TO FREE SPEECH

AN EVER WIDENING gap divided us from Soviet soil as the good ship *Byeloostrov* cast off. While Leningrad slipped astern, our immediate feelings were of unrestrained relief.

After years of hope and frustration, our final memory of the USSR was a three-hour hour with customs officials that left us angry and exhausted. Every carefully packed article was dragged out and scrutinized. A dyke doll of our daughter's that squeaked when squeezed aroused special suspicion.

Only at the end of a fruitless quest did we learn what they were looking for. At this point the chief inspector accused me of having sold our automobile illegally for gold to a Soviet citizen! I was able to furnish written refutation of this charge—the car in question had been legally transferred to a foreign diplomat—so the officials, looking somewhat crestfallen, permitted us to cram our effects back into trunks and go aboard.

This parting episode was final proof that our move was timely. Of late we had sensed imponderable walls closing in upon us. The air itself was clotted with hate and suspicion. The press attacks on everything American grew in violence and virulence. Closer to home, no week passed without American correspondents being pilloried as spies.

The anti American campaign penetrated even to the child world. Our son and daughter were taunted by their neighborhood playmates as "Amerikants," by now a term of





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and unless through a series of complex maneuvers we managed to shake them for a bit, they were on our trail from morning until we turned in.

It long has been commonly assumed that all telephones serving foreigners are connected to a central listening post—and on more than one occasion we had evidence that our line was carefully checked. However, there had not been, so we thought, any further penetration of the privacy of our home.

Then, one day, we caught Nastia rifling our personal desk drawers and collecting note pads and address books. Nastia had come to work for us back in 1946 as an apple-cheeked peasant girl fresh from the village. After one year, during which my wife trained her as a tolerable housemaid, she left to marry a policeman.

We next heard from her last spring, when she called up and asked for her job back. Since nobody wanted to work for Americans and servants were hard to get, my wife agreed to take her on. With that address book incident, we realized that Nastia, no longer the apple-cheeked peasant girl, had been assigned to us. We also

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Before these troubles, we had lived in Moscow as peace-

fully and unmolested as anywhere else in the world. Though

we saw few Russian friends, we took part in the social life

of the closely knit foreign colony, which can provide a

nightly party for those thus inclined.

We enjoyed to the full the splendid theaters, concerts,

and other cultural advantages of Moscow. But we had

...ing her out with the gift

Small wonder our last contacts with Soviet life around us disintegrated rapidly. Even the press department of the Foreign Ministry, through which all our official relations were funneled, now virtually ignored us. Our least request was ignored or refused.

All this was bearable as long as it remained impersonal. But early in 1949 we suddenly discovered that we were constantly being spied upon. Whenever someone entered or left the garden gate in front of our one story log house a curtain in a window opposite was raised slightly.

Young men, too well dressed for loners, lounged on nearby corners or strolled back and forth outside. Friends who dropped in were followed home and in due course called in for questioning. Our next-door neighbors, too, were grilled, and though we had known them for years, they took to avoiding us utterly.

Soon we noted that not only was the house watched, but we ourselves were shadowed wherever we went.

If my wife and I left the house separately by car or taxi, each of us was tailed by a little black German BMW car with four men inside. They tried to be inconspicuous, ducking behind trucks or trolley buses and whenever we halted, they, too, would pull up at a respectable distance, preferably just behind a corner.

We soon learned their techniques and one of our favorite sports was to lead them into a blind street and then make a U turn that brought us alongside. This seemed to embarrass them no end, and they would try to crouch down out of sight. The moment we got out of the car, they promptly deployed to strategic street corners or doorways, whence they could watch our moves.

They also followed us if we took the ~~the~~ ~~or street~~

be held for trial as long as Gubichev perhaps even longer.  
The Russians believe in precedents.

These were the implications that made our intensive shadowing seem especially sinister and speeded our departure.  
A strange climax for an assignment undertaken with the conviction that the world's future depends on understanding and friendship between the United States and Russia.

But I hold this conviction now more than ever!

trouble keeping art, music and dancing teachers for the children. There were plenty available, well qualified and reasonable. But the moment they discovered we were Americans—usually after the second or third lesson, we could not keep daughter from coming out with it—they bowed out on some pretext.

Even our German shepherd pup was subject to this same anti foreign discrimination. We tried in vain to enter him in a training school, or, failing that, arrange with some trainer for private instruction. Everything connected with dog training, we discovered, was under the army or civilian auxiliary command and only dogs with the proper communist political background at home could qualify.

Despite these drawbacks we were far better off than most foreign residents who had no contacts with the Russians and who lived in drab flats or hotel rooms. We had a home of our own, furnished and equipped like an American house, with everything, including the kitchen sink and a small but attractive garden.

We could only guess as to why we suddenly had become the objects of so much organized interest. But the timing suggested that the Gubichev case might have had some bearing. The Soviets, who claimed diplomatic immunity for this Russian United Nations employee arrested for espionage, said plainly in print that reprisals might be expected against Americans in Moscow.

The number of candidates for such reprisals was uncomfortably small, and of these the correspondents were the likeliest.

The Gubichev case had provided a new and dangerous precedent. Whereas some American reporters had simply been shipped out of Russia, any future case probably would

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**"STALIN is the Lenin of today"**

This recent formula, which Soviet editorial writers use with recurring frequency, sums up the postwar apotheosis of the Kremlin leader

At one time, Stalin claimed to be no more than the humble apprentice of Lenin, the great revolutionary master. The very term 'Stalinism' was coined as a derogatory epithet by political opponents.

Seldom in history has a man become a legend in his own lifetime. Yet Stalin the man already has been totally replaced by Stalin the legend where the Russian public is concerned.

The legendary Stalin is a mellow, unbleeding character, who lives to accept bouquets of flowers from little girls in token of thanks for their 'happy childhood'. He radiates gentle patience and benevolent wisdom.

All this bears little resemblance to the sharp, ruthless politician who gained control of the party machinery as Lenin's hand filtered and who, by a series of deft moves, not only consolidated his own position but outmaneuvered the entire group of Lenin's close associates who finally were disposed of during the purges of 1934-39.

Chief cultivator of the Stalin legend is Stalin himself. His mode of life, his every public act of utterance, is calculated to fit this role. Having divorced himself largely from the everyday business of government, he descends from the Olympian remoteness of his semi-retirement only at rare

intervals to make history with a few well-chosen words, usually in the form of a press release

Stalin has not made a public speech since February, 1946, when he addressed his constituents during the Supreme Soviet election campaign. From year to year, he lengthens his vacations at his Sochi villa on the Black Sea.

Meanwhile, responsibility for running the state gravitates increasingly to Stalin's lieutenants, the members of the Politburo. This is the level at which the struggle for personal power takes place.

The order of ascendancy at a given time always can be ascertained from the alignment of portraits displayed on Soviet holidays. When Andrei A. Zhdanov was alive, Stalin, in the center, was flanked invariably by Viachislav M. Molotov on the right and Zhdanov on the left.

Next to Molotov came Georgi M. Malenkov and next to Zhdanov, Laurenty P. Beria, but at one time Beria was alongside Molotov.

The demise of Zhdanov disarranged the pattern and for a time Beria and Malenkov appeared to be running neck and neck while Molotov continued to hold first place.

The race was so close that I recall how, during the November 7, 1947, festivities, the positions of Malenkov and Beria portraits were shifted twice in the course of a single day.

Within recent years, a major readjustment has occurred. Beria, a powerful figure by virtue of his control of the MVD and close personal relations with Stalin, does not appear to aspire to further advancement. Molotov, since he relinquished the foreign ministry, has gone into partial eclipse. Russians say that Molotov, even in his prime, was important



Alexander Kuznetsov, trade union chairman, both products of Zhdanov's party organization.

While Zhdanov sometimes was inclined to overreach himself, as in the 1939 attack on Finland, the expulsion of Tito from the Cominform, and the Berlin blockade, Malenkov favors consolidation of present holdings before attempting further expansion. It would be utterly wrong to construe this as meaning a softer policy more "friendly" or conciliatory toward the West. There is nothing soft or "friendly" about Malenkov.

At home, Malenkov's consolidation policy has meant wholesale collectivization of the Balts, deportation of "unreliable" elements from border and coastal areas, and renewed discrimination against the Jews.

There has been no letup in the party indoctrination campaign in all spheres of learning and culture which Zhdanov initiated. Part of the Malenkov policy has been to intensify the anti American campaign, to expend enormous efforts and resources on blacking out the Voice of America radio-casts in Russian.

Abroad, the Malenkov consolidation policy has meant tighter control of the Cominform countries, ruthless elimination of "Titoists," of all Communists with the slightest spirit of independence, universal and arbitrary imposition of the Soviet economic pattern, including collectivization of the peasantry and destruction of the middle classes, using the extrajudicial technique of the MVD, as well as the "model" trials with their self accusations.

Malenkov's caution is reflected in the lifting of the Berlin blockade and in the fact that the campaign against Tito has so far stopped short of actual invasion. But such things are a matter of cold judgment and tactics and do not express

only as the appendage or reflection of Stalin and was never a personality in his own right. His present decline, they add, is simply the result of Stalin's increased retirement.

The rivalry between Zhdanov and Malenkov was long an open secret. It was a struggle between antithetical temperaments rather than opposing political views. Zhdanov was the brilliant intellectual, inclined to brashness, but with a keen instinct of leadership, the only spellbinder in the Politburo. His intense party zeal was flavored strongly with Russian nationalism. He was a man of considerable cultural background, thoroughly versed in Russian literature and with a rich command of his native language. He was, in addition, an accomplished amateur pianist. Like other Soviet leaders of his generation, his knowledge of the outside world was negligible.

Malenkov is the typical product of the party apparatus, in which he has spent his entire adult life. Lacking mass appeal, he dislikes the limelight and prefers to pull wires behind the scenes. Cautious where Zhdanov was impetuous, plodding where Zhdanov was brilliant, Malenkov has a brain closely akin to the vast party card index which he keeps as chief of the party organization. He thus occupies today much the same strategic post that Stalin held when Lenin was failing. He has the same talent for party machine manipulation that stood Stalin in good stead in the days of the struggle for Lenin's mantle. Zhdanov, by comparison, had more of Trotsky's characteristics.

During the past year, Malenkov has used his position to carry out a quiet but thorough purge from key posts of Zhdanov's proteges and appointees, the most important of whom were Nikolai Voznesensky, member of the Politburo and chairman of the State Planning Commission, and

I recall the case—shortly before World War II—of a former American woman of Russian origin who had returned to Russia and taken out Soviet citizenship. Later, for personal reasons she decided she wanted to give up her Soviet citizenship and return to the United States.

Finally, after several years of fruitless battling with the visa authorities, she asked for and was granted an interview with Kalinin. Gruffly, he thumbed through her file.

"You were born in Russia. You didn't like it. You went to America?" he inquired.

"Yes," said the woman.

"You didn't like it in America. You came back to Russia?"

"Yes," the woman answered once again.

"You don't like it here. You want to go back to America?"

"Why, er—" began the woman, flustered by such abruptness.

"That is all," Kalinin broke in. "I shall see what can be done. Citizenship."

Before the astonished visitor could utter thanks, she was whisked out. Ten days later, she got her exit visa.

While all the men on the Politburo are capable and devoted to the Communist cause, individual ability varies. Least brilliant of the lot, by general agreement, is Klement Voroshilov, pre-war Commissar for Defense until Stalin took over. Today Voroshilov continues to fill a marshal's uniform, but he has no major responsibilities. During the purge, Voroshilov lost his closest assistants—Gamarnik, Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Yegorov, and a host of others, including much of the Soviet Army high command. The circumstance that he himself survived this holocaust as well as the discovery of serious gaps in Soviet preparedness in



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Nikita Khrushchev has been Stalin's faithful if not brilliant proconsul in the Ukraine ever since the purge eliminated the previous Ukrainian party hierarchy. Nikolai Shvernik graduated into high politics from the trade union bureaucracy where he served for years as chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. He succeeded Kalinin as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet—titular chief of state. But under his incumbency that office no longer is the clearing house for personal grievances; it was under Kalinin. His chief duties are passing out government decorations and receiving heads of foreign missions.

Most colorless figure in the Politburo is easily Andrei Andreyevich Andreyev (known as Triple A), who has held innumerable posts without known distinction, who never writes or says anything for publication and is almost never mentioned in any connection, but whose photograph always turns up at the right place in time to dispel recurrent rumors of his disgrace.

Alexander Kosygin, like Voznesensky, is a product of Zhdanov's Leningrad party organization who was brought down to Moscow to work in the upper party echelon under Zhdanov's patronage. Because of this background his future appears uncertain under the Malenkov ascendancy.

The names and faces of several additional younger men often are bracketed with those of the Politburo as members of the upper party echelon.

Until recently, the outstanding member of this group was Mikhail Suslov, named chief of the party's Agitation and Propaganda Department when Zhdanov was in the saddle. Suslov, who had a distinguished record for underground party activity in the North Caucasus during the German

the early weeks of the German invasion, is commonly attributed to Stalin's personal fondness for and loyalty to his old friend 'Klim' The present minister of armed forces, who took over when Stalin gave up the post two years ago, is Nikolai Bulganin, product of the Moscow party organization

L Kaganovich continues to hold his place as the sole Jew in the Politburo and top party echelon He is famed as the party's outstanding trouble shooter, who at various times has brought order out of chaos in agriculture, heavy industry and railways

His management of the Soviet Union's overworked and inadequate transportation system in wartime was a brilliant contribution to victory At various time Kaganovich's two younger brothers have held important posts His sister reportedly is Stalin's present (third) wife

Armenian Anastas Mikoyan also is a durable member of the inner circle, although no longer minister of foreign trade A keen and enterprising businessman, in prewar times, as commissar of the food industry, Mikoyan was an enthusiastic convert to American methods On his return from a trip to the United States he set up ice-cream factories and meat picking plants with machinery purchased in America—and started a vigorous campaign to add tomato juice and hot dogs to the Russian diet He even opened an automat restaurant and a cafeteria, both copied from American models

Today such activities would have earned him disgrace and condemnation as a 'cosmopolitan' and 'slavish emulator of the decadent bourgeois West' But in those days Stalin himself liked to use America as an example of what his countrymen should learn

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## THIS IS RUSSIA

occupation, twice accompanied Zhdanov to meetings of the Cominform. His present status is not entirely clear.

Another member of this group is P. K. Ponomarenko, who, before he was called to Moscow, was secretary of the party in Byelorussia. He, too, had a distinguished war record as leader of partisan operations.

A third figure in the group is Georgi Popov, present head of the Moscow party organization and a strong Malenkov man, destined to go places with his patron.

All the men in this last group are, or were, designated as secretaries of the Central Committee and it is from their number that vacancies in the Politburo—down to twelve from normal strength of fourteen—would logically be filled. Quite possibly new members already have been chosen without the event's being made public.

Lacking other sources, the Russian people long since have learned that the surest way of telling who is out or in is by the protracted absence of certain names and photographs from the press—as was the case with Voznesensky—and the repeated appearance of others—as with Ponomarenko.

But until the next party congress, the public at large will not be told officially just who the new top party leaders are.

# RUBBER-STAMP PARLIAMENT, RUBBER-STAMP PARTY

## I

"WE RUSSIANS," a friend once remarked to me, "can claim one priority that nobody ever will challenge. We have invented the world's dumbest parliament."

My friend was giving an average citizen's opinion of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., defined by the Soviet Constitution as 'the highest organ of state power of the U.S.S.R.'

The best indication of what the Kremlin bosses really think of their sovereign Parliament is the fact that the Supreme Soviet is the one government body whose proceedings are open to foreign correspondents and diplomats. In the Soviet Union this is a sure sign that no state matters of consequence are to be dealt with.

For a fortnight each year, usually in February or March, some one thousand, eight hundred Supreme Soviet deputies converge on Moscow from all corners of the country. They are a colorful crowd, central Asiatics and Caucasians in their native costumes, gilded marshals and generals with chests full of shiny medals.

In the Great Hall of the Kremlin, where the last Romanovs were crowned, they sit through endless speeches and vote when called on to do so. With punctilious adherence to parliamentary procedure, the chairman calls for a show

of those in favor—a forest of hands shoots up. Next he asks for those opposed. Not one hand is raised, and so the chairman announces *Nyet!* Finally, he asks for the abstentions. Again not a single hand, and again the same announcement. The chairman then declares that the measure or law up for vote has been unanimously adopted and moves on to the next item.

The main business of every Supreme Soviet session is the adoption of the annual budget. Just how the budget happened to be chosen for these deliberations, or some other field of government activity, is a Kremlin secret. The Soviet Constitution, which sets forth the Supreme Soviet's functions, says nothing about its concentrating on the budget.

Yet, for the better part of a week, after approving the agenda for the sessions, the delegates listen first to the draft of the budget presented by the minister of finance, next to speeches by various delegates proposing minor changes and amendments, and then to the final draft again presented by the finance minister, substantially the same as the initial draft, save that a few minor changes and recommendation have been incorporated.

The presentation of the draft is made at a joint session of both houses. This is when Prime Minister Joseph Stalin and the other members of the Politburo put in an appearance. They sit on a raised platform at the far end of the hall behind the speaker's stand, in the shadow of a tall white marble Lenin.

After the first half hour or so, Stalin usually saunters out, and gradually the others follow suit. Thereafter, the "highest law making organ in the land" continues . . .

without the party leaders, save that the marble Lenin is always there

Just how much relation these deliberations have to the actual conduct of affairs is indicated by the circumstance that the budget for 1946 was not debated and approved until October, when the fiscal year was almost over

Nor do the billions of rubles dealt with in the budget give much of a clue to the actual state of the country's economy, in view of the highly nebulous value of the ruble

After the initial joint sitting, the two chambers of the Supreme Soviet hold their meetings separately. The finance minister submits his final draft, first to one chamber for approval, and then to the other, which means that he makes virtually the same speech three separate times

Having passed the budget, in the last half hour of its final session, each chamber hears the reports of the Supreme Soviet Præsidium and of the Council of Ministers on ukases and decrees, appointments and dismissals during the time elapsed since the previous session

This is as close as the Supreme Soviet ever gets to the actual substance of government. Everything is approved in rapid fire succession

Never has the Supreme Soviet let the Præsidium or the council down by vetoing any measure passed between sessions

Only on one occasion in its history was the Supreme Soviet's unanimity record ruffled—and that was easily ironed out. Once when the agenda was up for approval at the opening meeting, a woman delegate raised her hand as "opposed." Then, to a flabbergasted assembly, she explained that she objected to a proposed meeting Sunday, and she



of those in favor—a forest of hands shoots up. Next he asks for those opposed. Not one hand is raised, and so the chairman announces ‘*Nyet!*’ Finally, he asks for the abstentions. Again not a single hand, and again the same announcement. The chairman then declares that the measure or law up for vote has been unanimously adopted and moves on to the next item.

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After the first half hour or so, Stalin usually saunters out, and gradually the others follow suit. Thereafter, the ‘highest law making organ in the land’ continues its deliberations.



was sure other out-of-town delegates agreed with her, as this would prevent them from seeing the ballet "Swan Lake." The matter was arranged to suit her convenience, harmony was restored, and the agenda speedily approved—unanimously. But everyone present somehow felt a genuine blow for democracy had been struck.

Thereafter, the arrangements invariably have provided the delegates with plenty of time to look around and enjoy the sights and amenities of the Soviet capital. This was easy, since the two chambers, using the same hall, meet alternately. When not meeting, the delegates are out on the town. The best blocks of ballet and theater seats are reserved for them. Before rationing was abolished, they were provided with coupons to the best stores, serving high government and secret police officials. At present, they all have liberal expense allowances, in addition to free board at Moscow's three best hotels, and to free transport.

So eager is the Kremlin to confirm the impression that the Supreme Soviet, like the Soviet people whom they claim to represent, is just one big, happy family, that the least reference to serious difficulties or disagreements by some individual delegate is generally deleted from the stenogram. The Supreme Soviet in all respects faithfully images the one-party ballot system that elected it.

As for the Supreme Soviets of the R S F S R (Russia proper), and other union republics, they simply approve budgets under the amounts assigned to each republic through the all-union budget. Their proceedings are correspondingly less eventful and shorter than those of the U. S. S. R. Supreme Soviet.

The determination to keep : "

Supreme Soviet may seem puzzling. Surely a little lively discussion, a bit of dissent, a clash of opinion even on non essentials would lend at least a semblance of plausibility to the performance.

As matters now stand, while the Supreme Soviet may serve to confirm fellow travelers abroad in the belief that the Soviet Union is a democracy, it impresses few thinking individuals inside the country. The disillusionment my friend voiced is extremely widespread. From the internal propaganda standpoint, the Supreme Soviet is something of a liability, since its threadbare, humorless parody of parliamentary forms serves as a constant reminder to the Russians of how unfree they are.

A likely answer is that here we are dealing with one of the Soviet inconsistencies. When the constitution establishing the present parliamentary system was written, Stalin and his assistants may well have honestly envisaged the gradual introduction of democratic features. The police state, however, operates and evolves according to an inner logic of its own—a logic that not even Stalin can alter. In a sense, not even he can control the Frankenstein he helped to fashion. And the police state eyes even the least hint of genuine freedom and democracy with abhorrence and dread.

was sure other out-of-town delegates agreed with her, as this would prevent them from seeing the ballet "Swan Lake." The matter was arranged to suit her convenience, harmony was restored, and the agenda speedily approved—unanimously. But everyone present somehow felt a genuine blow for democracy had been struck.

Thereafter, the arrangements invariably have provided the delegates with plenty of time to look around and enjoy the sights and amenities of the Soviet capital. This was easy, since the two chambers, using the same hall, meet alternately. When not meeting, the delegates are out on the town. The best blocks of ballet and theater seats are reserved for them. Before rationing was abolished, they were provided with coupons to the best stores, serving high government and secret police officials. At present, they all have liberal expense allowances, in addition to free board at Moscow's three best hotels, and to free transport.

So eager is the Kremlin to confirm the impression that the Supreme Soviet, like the Soviet people whom they claim to represent, is just one big, happy family, that the least reference to serious difficulties or disagreements by some individual delegate is generally deleted from the stenogram. The Supreme Soviet in all respects faithfully images the one party ballot system that elected it.

As for the Supreme Soviets of the R.S.F.S.R. (Russia proper), and other union republics, they simply approve budgets under the amounts assigned to each republic through the all union budget. Their proceedings are correspondingly less eventful and shorter than those of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet.

The determination to keep all genuine debate out of the

From any standpoint, it is high time for a party congress. Not only has the mandate of the present party leadership technically lapsed, the entire composition of the party rank and file has changed.

By 1939, as a result of the purges, party membership had shrunk from a prewar high of around three million to less than two million. Today, after mass induction of younger elements from the army as a wartime morale-building measure, the figure has soared to beyond five million.

The new members never have had an opportunity to vote for representatives to the higher party organs.

The major preliminaries to a party congress took place last winter, when local party congresses were held in the regions, territories, autonomous and union republics.

According to the theory of "democratic centralism," the lower level elects its representatives to the next higher level, and so forth, the source of authority being the rank and file membership at the base of the pyramid.

In current Soviet practice, it works exactly the other way around. Authority emanates from the Politburo at the peak and is delegated downward. The lower party levels simply carry out directives from above.

Under this dispensation, initiative and originality are not encouraged within the party apparatus. Party members are judged by the readiness with which they obey or transmit orders from above. The result is an amazing uniformity, not only of policy, but even of thought and verbal expression.

This was strikingly apparent in the reports of the party secretaries to the local party congresses. Though delivered

**N**O ALL-UNION CONGRESS of the Soviet Communist Party has been held since 1939, though party rules prescribe that these congresses must be called at least once every three years

Technically, it could be argued, therefore, that the present party leadership's mandate expired more than eight years ago and that the Soviet leaders have been acting illegally ever since. To date, however, no party member has tried to raise the issue

People in Russia have learned to attach no importance to such technicalities. I once pointed out to a Russian acquaintance that Article 46 of the Soviet Constitution provides that the Supreme Soviet (parliament) shall sit twice yearly, whereas in practice there usually is only one session a year, which promptly adjourns after approving the budget.

My friend was frankly surprised at my comment. But think of the extra trouble and expense involved if they met twice yearly,' he objected. 'And besides, what on earth would they do?'

The All Union party Congress is the supreme assemblage of the Communist party, with technical powers to shape or reshape party policy and select or reject party leadership. It elects the Central Committee which in turn elects the Politburo from among its own numbers, as well as the Orgburo, and the Central Committee secretaries. Technically, the Party Congress is free to change the top party leadership.

where passed about the West. Identical flattering references were made to Stalin, followed by time out for "thunderous applause."

There are good indications that the Kremlin would like to impose a similar uniformity and unanimity on the one hundred and ninety five million non-party members of motley peoples under its rule.

One significant thread running through every local congress was a new stress on the close ties between the non-Russian nationalities of each republic and the great Russian people everywhere exalted as the universal standard-bearers of civilization.

Uzbekistan Party Secretary Yusupov (himself Russian) even dug up a quotation from Friedrich Engels, dated 1851, lauding Russia's role in the Orient as "progressive." At the same time Yusupov sternly warned against any notion that the close similarity between the Uzbek and Turkish languages signified any cultural or historic kinship. This, he said, was pan-Turkism which was anti-Marxist, and a tool of Anglo-American imperialism.

Azerbaijan Party Secretary Bagirov urged all Azerbaijanians to master Russian—the language of our big brother, the native tongue of our multi-millioned, multi-national Soviet family. He illustrated his argument with a quotation from a local nineteenth century poet:

My son know you Russian science

Master you that language.

We need them Without them the world is dark

It

that

... of Kazakstan were being



in different languages and in widely separated areas, they all sounded as though written by the same hand

On January 25, 1949, in Kiev, Nikita Khrushchev, in his capacity of secretary of the Ukrainian Communist party (he also is a member of the Politburo), began his report to the local party congress as follows

'Comrades Since the Fifteenth Congress of the Communist party of the Ukraine, more than eight and a half years have elapsed This period was replete with events of world wide historic importance '

Khrushchev spoke in Ukrainian That very same afternoon, more than a thousand miles away in Tbilisi, Secretary Charkviani of the Georgian Communist party was telling delegates to the Georgian party Congress

'Comrades Since the Thirteenth Congress of the Communist Party of Georgia, nearly nine years have elapsed—a period replete with the greatest historic events

years have elapsed During those years, extremely important events took place "

Some days later, on February 10, Party Secretary Bogolyubov told the Kirghizian party Congress Comrades Since the Sixth Congress of the Communist party of Kirghizia, almost nine years have elapsed This was a period replete with the greatest worldwide historic events

So on down the party line ad infinitum Allowing for differences in local problems, much the same uniformity prevailed throughout the proceedings of all the local party congresses Identical uncomplimentary remarks were every-



rewritten, since, he said, the authors had wrongly pictured Kazak history as a long struggle for independence and had failed to deal adequately with the historic and economic ties between the Kazaks and the Russians.

It follows that the Kremlin would much prefer that the Kazaks and other members of the Soviet family concentrate on learning Russian, "the language of our big brother," rather than studying the history of their own struggles for independence from Russia. Stalin himself has always stressed that knowledge is a guide to action.

## 3

**I**N THE February, 1948, elections to the Supreme Soviet of the R.S.F.S.R. (Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic), the voters of the Stalin district in the city of Moscow piled up an all time election record. It was officially announced that one hundred per cent of the electorate had gone to the polls, and that every one of them had voted for Comrade Stalin, who always runs in the Stalin district.

In Moscow's Molotov district, where by happy coincidence Viachislav M. Molotov was running, the voters gave their choice a similar thumping endorsement, other members of the Politburo in their respective districts followed close behind—99 per cent, 99.8 per cent, and so on, neatly graduated in decimals according to order of importance.

In fostering the form—if not the substance—of democ-

fact, Soviet Russia is probably the votingest country in the world. Never a winter passes without an election to one of the innumerable elective government bodies—the various supreme soviets, the regional, city and district soviets—the jurors and judges of the People's Courts.

Whatever the choice of bodies, there never is a choice of candidates, only the single party ticket, or, as the Soviet press likes to call it, "the ticket of the bloc of party and non-party Bolsheviks." In Russian the word for "choice" and "election" is one and the same, and what it boils down to is choice without choice.

Voting for the ticket merely requires folding the ballot and dropping it into the urn.

Voting against the ticket, however, means crossing out the name or names on the printed form. To do that the voter would have to use one of the little curtained booths provided at every polling place.

It is easy to see why practically everybody shuns the booths and prefers to stick to the simpler procedure of dropping the ballot unaltered and in full view of the election officials.

Once, when a group of United States correspondents toured a polling place during elections, a gray haired citizen asked us, with just the trace of a smile: "Where else do they have elections like these?"

The actual vote in a Soviet election is but the culmination of a long and complex process. Even though there are no opposition tickets and the Communist party has the field to itself, everyone goes through the motions of an intensive campaign, in which the press and radio take full part.

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Sometimes, when he got through with Adelina, the agitator, new to the district, would start working on us, unaware that we were not Soviet citizens and therefore unable to vote in the impending elections. When we explained this to him, he would himself become agitated, mumble an apology, and make a beeline for the exit.

On election morning, a member of the block committee would come around to make sure Adelina was going to the polls.

Election time was the only time Adelina's government ever remembered her existence—that is, until one day I had a phone call from the Foreign Ministry.

A voice on the other end inquired: "Does a certain Citizeness Fitterer work for you?"

"Yes," I replied. "She is our cook."

"I am sorry," said the voice, "but I must request that you discharge her immediately, she is not authorized to work for foreigners."

MVD's unreliable list, even though her family had lived in Russia for generations.

Her sole surviving relatives, a sister and brother in law, had long since been "transferred" to Kazakhstan. Adelina had been spared because she had been working at Spaso House. But then she left and came to work for us, and after the hardest job of

kept sobbing, suppressing her questions to no one in particular.

First, nominating meetings are called, usually under the joint sponsorship of the trade union and party locals, at which candidates are proposed and seconded. And regardless of how many separate meetings are held in a single district, so well does the party apparatus function that never is there any conflict or discrepancy in the list of nominees.

Then comes a continuous round of election rallies where hundreds of speakers sing the praises of the Soviet state, the Communist party and the Soviet electoral system, and take pot shots at the outside world.

Besides mass rallies, there are numberless factory and neighborhood meetings. Moreover, every city block has its *agitpunkt* (literally, agitation point), whither individual voters may repair and hear the same things personally from party propagandists—'agitators'. Even the stay-at-homes are sure to be visited at least once, and possibly several times, by mobile *agit* brigades and propagandists who make door-to-door rounds.

The election campaigns thus provide the authorities with a splendid pretext for checking up on any unauthorized residents.

We, too, as householders, were not immune from these annual electioneering visitations.

The agitator would ring the doorbell and ask if this was where Citizeness Fitterer lived. After a moment we realized he was referring to our Adelina, our Crimean Volksdeutsche cook, the only name from our address on the voters' list.

We would direct our caller to the kitchen, where for about a quarter of an hour he would agitate Adelina on the advantages of being a Soviet citizen, warmed by the sun of the Stalin Constitution and able to take part in the coming elections.





We offered to let her stay on in the house until she found another place, but she insisted on getting out the next day. She had a friend who could shelter her in a corner temporarily. She would look for employment with a Russian family.

We ran into her some months later; she was still looking. Each time she applied for a job everything went fine until the people learned she had been working for foreigners whereupon she would be discharged. Now she was thinking of joining her relatives. We never saw her again.

But I sometimes wonder where Adelina is and if around election time they still remember to tell her about the benefits of Soviet "democracy" and see that she votes.

## THE SOVIET ELITE

A sudden hush has settled on Moscow's busy Arbat Street. The sleek asphalt roadway, emptied of its traffic, threads between two lines of white uniformed, white gloved police paced at ten meter intervals along either curb.

The police are on tenterhooks, their eyes strained toward the far end of the street. One of them darts out, bodily lifts up an old peasant woman who has strayed into the road, and deposits her back on the sidewalk. The tension rises to its climax.

With a sudden swoosh a shiny black sedan flashes down the fairway, then an open car full of bodyguards follows in close pursuit. The tension is over in a trice, and the Arbat returns to noisy normal.

Bystanders exchange knowing nods. *Hozyain proyekhali* (There went the boss).

But the black sedan was curtained too heavily and went by too fast for anyone to identify the rear-seat passengers. And the bosses who thus speed between their offices and *dachas* (country houses) twice daily during the summer are not one but numerous.

In a matter of minutes they are rolling along the smooth Uspenskoye Chaussee highway through charming country. It is like an enchanted land out of a Russian fairy tale. The low built peasant *izbas* (cottages) are trim, with brightly

printed roofs and pretty flowerbeds behind neat fences. The borders of the highway are carefully landscaped and even the side roads are tarmacked. Immaculate policemen, just like those along the Arbat, stand at every intersection.

The *dachas* too, have an air of enchantment. White walls and shining gabled roofs glisten through the dark ever green foliage along the side of the Moskva River, and woe to the mere mortal who treads too nigh these magic dwellings. Without the proper MVD (secret police) credentials he will land himself in major trouble.

Once, while out for a drive the summer before last, we took a wrong turn and ended up at a tall green gate. There was nobody in sight, but realizing our mistake, we made a quick turnabout.

A figure in an MVD blue cap suddenly materialized from the bushes, waving his arms, red faced and furious. As I pulled up, he demanded to know where we were going. Having heard our explanation and apparently impressed by our car, he warned, "Don't let me ever see you around here again."

This whole area along the Moskva River west of the capital is officially designated as the "Forbidden Zone." Only persons with special MVD clearance may reside there—and no foreigners, under any circumstances!

Last year, we still could drive along the main roads, and the diplomatic corps often picnicked and bathed in the area. Now, however, all foreign cars are turned back at the city limits.

Many of the Soviet great and near-great, from Prime Minister Joseph Stalin down, have their *dachas* in the Forbidden Zone. Besides top government ministers, and leaders of the ar

clude factory directors, members of the Academy of Sciences, prominent authors, artists, and stage celebrities

These privileged groups comprise the cream of Soviet society. Not that the Russians have even a remote counterpart of Western social life. There are no country clubs in the Forbidden Zone. Neighbors seldom call—in fact, they usually do not even know one another unless their work brings them into contact.

There are two main factors tending to discourage free social conduct within Soviet high officialdom. The first is fear. Such contact is frowned on by the ever-suspicious, ever vigilant MVD. Moreover, personal friends are potentially dangerous. If they know too much, they may denounce you—or if they get into trouble, your ties with them may incriminate you. During the great purges many persons were undone by their private relationships. A prudent Russian today hesitates to confide in even his wife too fully.

The second factor that circumscribes the cultural as well as the social life of the high Soviet official is work. Few persons work harder and longer hours than those in responsible Soviet positions. The average workday of a Soviet official begins around eleven o'clock in the morning when, after a hasty breakfast, he heads for his office. There he works through steadily until after midnight, with brief time out at four and again at nine o'clock for a bite in the buffet or dining room.

"Reception hours" in most government offices and ministries run from eleven at night until one in the morning, and during this time the official must be on deck just in case the Kremlin telephones or one of his superiors drops by with a query. He gets home about two in the morning, when his faithful wife has dinner ready—and so to bed.

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of a revolutionary new society, their behavior patterns are surprisingly conservative and conventional. Indeed, they are more restricted and inhibited than their counterparts in Western "bourgeois" countries.

The most pampered group in Soviet society consists of the leading lights in "art"—in Russia, a generic term that covers letters, music, stage, and screen, as well as the graphic arts.

Successful authors, musicians, painters, and, pre-eminently, playwrights and theatrical celebrities, enjoy a degree of personal liberty and exemption from restrictions far beyond

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hers—foreigners now excepted.

This is partly because their work is not of a confidential nature and involves no knowledge of state secrets. Furthermore, social contacts are considered a legitimate and essential part of their creative endeavors.

The impact of party ideology on the country's intellectual and cultural life will be dealt with separately. For the present purposes of economic and social comparison, it is enough to point out that even under the present doctrinaire compulsions on his work the artist is freer than the state official. Provided he has a keen nose for the Communist party line, he need have few qualms for the future. And there are no limits to the earning opportunities of the Soviet author or composer who writes what the party wants.

Constantine Simonov, most affluent and prolific of the post-war authors, usually has several plays running simultaneously in hundreds of theaters all over the Soviet Union, and he is entitled to royalties on each performance. To simplify bookkeeping, the government now has given Simonov a "blank account." This means he can draw any

After a week of this routine, when Sunday rolls around, rare is the husband with strength or inclination for any thing beyond a brief round of shopping. Nor does the wife of such a Soviet functionary have much independent existence of her own. With rare exceptions, such as Mme Molotov, wife of M. Molotov, and twice a commissar in her own right under her maiden name, the ordinary Soviet official's wife is not a career woman. Though she be married to a member of the mighty Politburo, the public probably has never seen her picture or even her name in print. The Soviet press does not go in for either society or gossip columns.

The official's wife goes to the ballet, the theater, or a concert *only on those rare occasions* when her husband can get off to escort her, though she may take in a motion picture from time to time unescorted.

Ordinarily, the Soviet official's *dacha*, town flat, and his automobile all go with his job, so if demoted or dismissed he stands to lose much. At the same time the charges he pays for these facilities are almost nominal. His salary, with allowances, may range up to 8000 or 10,000 rubles monthly (about \$2000).

Academy members, who are in a class by themselves, draw a total of 25,000 rubles a month (about \$6,250). In addition their regular incomes are supplemented from time to time by cash bonuses, especially in the case of factory directors.

Such is life among the upper Soviet official and managerial classes at or near the apex of the Soviet social pyramid.

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themselves and family, have three square meals a day, are adequately clothed, and can still afford theater tickets three or four times a month. They work a regular eight hour day and make the most of their leisure time.

In summer, if they are fortunate, they may obtain a *dacha* at low rental from the organization employing them. Otherwise, they can rent a room in a peasant *izba* in a village near Moscow. Lacking automobile transportation, the majority park their families in the country for the summer and go out by train for week ends, taking with them food supplies and kerosene.

Immediately below in the social scale come the white collar office employees and industrial workers. After the various deductions for state loan subscriptions, trade union dues, insurance, and such, the cash income in this category is somewhere between 1000 and 500 rubles (\$250 and \$125) a month. A majority of wives, as well as husbands, work, less because they want to take advantage of equal opportunities for women than because one pay envelope is not enough to make ends meet.

Persons at this level get enough to eat, though the diet is a bit unbalanced and monotonous, with too much bread and potatoes and not much meat and fruit. Most of the earnings, in fact, go for food, especially when there are children, on a rather elementary hand-to-mouth basis. Clothing is a constant, acute problem, and seldom is there money left over for incidentals or even for things which in Western countries are looked on as essentials.

Not many families in this category—which comprises the overwhelming majority of the Soviet urban population—can at present, without, boast even a small set of matching

amount whenever he wishes. This makes him one of the first individuals to practice the principle of full fledged communism. From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.

Reportedly, Simonov finds that this arrangement rather cramps his style, since he is more reticent now about drawing large sums than when he had a definite amount credited to his balance.

The artist also is in a better position to accumulate tangible wealth. He may purchase or build his own *dacha* designed and decorated to his own taste. This has obvious advantages in case one encounters reverses. Thus the humorist Zoschenko, when he fell from grace in 1946, retired to his *dacha* near Leningrad and quietly raised poultry.

The artist likewise may acquire a city flat of his own in one of the writers or artists co-operatives. He also can have a private car of his own.

Simonov has a Cadillac, Ehrenburg a Buick, as befits their respective stations. Nor is this preference regarded as inconsistent with the party line. After all, Stalin still rides in a Packard in preference to a ZIS.

It is a nose dive from the exalted status of the leading artists to the level of less successful but aspiring colleagues. Economically, the latter merge with the general mass of the Soviet intelligentsia—the professors, doctors, lawyers, technicians, heads of departments, lesser functionaries and skilled workers who comprise the middle class of Soviet urban society.

These are the people who earn from 1000 to 3000 rubles (\$250 to \$750) a month, plus occasional bonuses. They are well housed by Soviet standards, with one or two rooms ~~for~~

themselves and family, have three square meals a day, are adequately clothed, and can still afford theater tickets three or four times a month. They work a regular eight hour day and make the most of their leisure time.

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Clothing and household essentials

Not many families in this category—which comprises the overwhelming majority of the Soviet urban population—can boast even a small set of matching



## THE PLIGHT OF THE PEASANT

EVER SINCE her husband went off to war, never to return, "Auntie Dasha's whole economy revolved around her cow. Each morning at four she milked the patient animal, trudged two miles to the railway station with her two cans of milk, and caught the five forty

Arriving in Moscow at six fifteen, she delivered by street-car to her five steady customers, caught the seven fifteen back from town, hurried home with her empty cans, helped herself to some boiled potato mash from a big, black pot on the cold stove, and after hasty instructions to son Grisha, aged eight, was out of the house in time to report at nine o'clock for the day's field work on the collective farm

At one o'clock Auntie Dasha came home, lit the samovar, built just enough fire in the stove to warm the pot. After that she and Grisha had their main meal of the day, consisting of warmed up boiled potato mash and generous chunks of black rye bread, washed down with "tea" brewed from dried raspberry leaves

By three o'clock she was back in the field, where she worked until six getting home just as the cows, back from grazing, ambled through the village, mooing lustily, while the little cowherd brought up the rear, cracking his long rope whip

Each cow, including Auntie Dasha's, turned in at its own stamping. While the cow waited for her

dishes or cutlery. If a relative or friend drops in for dinner, more often than not an extra plate, cup, knife, fork, and spoon must be borrowed from the neighbors.

Such lack of household equipment is largely an aftermath of the war, when most persons were shunted about and things got lost or broken in the process. The condition of the white-collar and factory worker has improved markedly in the two years since the currency reform.

Though housing conditions still are bad for many workers, with entire families crowded into single rooms, relief is in prospect. Moreover, the Soviet employee or worker pays far less out of his earnings for rent, heat, light, and other communal services than does the wage earner in Western countries.

The Soviet urban middle class and working class, which are closely interrelated, not only comprise the base of the social pyramid, but are the mainstay of the political structure. Most of them feel they have a stake in the Soviet system and it commands their loyalty. These groups serve as the Communist party's chief recruiting ground.

The lowest layer of Soviet city population consists of a motley assortment of "unorganized" humanity, largely unskilled labor, with a high percentage of women. In summer, they work on construction jobs, road repair, or ditch digging. In winter, they clear snow. Most of them are newly arrived from the country. In time, many move on to better regular employment.

There are also speculators, criminal elements, and others with no visible roots or means of support. Still, by comparison with the West—though no statistics are available—there appears to be less organized crime in the Soviet Union.

five hundred eggs. In place of these, she paid a cash equivalent of five hundred rubles.

After meeting all these obligations last year, she still had more than six hundred rubles left with which to buy fodder for the winter.

Auntie Dasha met her remaining obligations to the state in kind. She filled her meat quota by slaughtering the calf which her cow bore regularly each January. Her private potato patch yielded her six hundred kilograms of potatoes. After delivering her quota of three hundred kilos to the state, this left her with three hundred kilos, which was just enough to take care of herself and Grisha through the coming year.

In the fall, she received a load of hay and a large bag of turnips from the collective farm as payment for her work days. The collective farm chairman, whose house had a new tin roof, had explained at a members' meeting just why that year the collective farm was in no position to pay off in grain or cash.

But his arithmetic was way over Auntie Dasha's head, and anyway she was thankful for the hay.

All in all, it had been a fairly good year. She had rented the front part of her *izba* to my family for the summer for eight hundred rubles. Even after paying the fifty per cent tax on "unearned" revenue, this would give her money for shoes for the winter.

That was in 1948. When we saw Auntie Dasha again, she had just been notified that under the newly decreed scale, all her delivery quotas had been raised. Sadly, she had about decided to sell the cow and buy chickens with the proceeds. She still would have to fill her egg meat, and



in the shed, Auntie Dasha went off to inspect her large potato patch, just to check up on Grisha's hoeing. When Sunday came, she would tend it herself. After the evening milking, followed by a supper of cold potato mash and black bread, Auntie Dasha would sit down to do her sums. She could neither read nor write, but necessity had taught her figures.

Laboriously, she multiplied the day's yield of milk in liters by the day's market price in rubles. Next she subtracted her train fare, then her streetcar fare, then the cost of a kilo of black bread and any incidental purchases, such as matches, a candle, or some salt. She checked the remainder against the cash knotted in her kerchief before she deposited it in her mattress.

With the market price of milk fluctuating seasonally between three and seven rubles (60 cents to \$1.40) a quart and her cow giving about three hundred quarts a year, Auntie Dasha grossed around thirty-five hundred rubles (\$760) a year. She spent about five hundred rubles (\$100) on black bread (at one ruble 75 kopecks a kilo), and other incidentals. Transportation, with the new fare increases, added up to more than six hundred rubles (\$120). This left a balance of something under twenty-seven hundred rubles (\$540).

At this point, the figuring became more involved. As the owner of a private cow and with half a hectare of land for her private use, Auntie Dasha had obligations to the state. She had a state delivery quota of thirty kilos of butter a year, but in lieu of butter she was permitted to pay a cash equivalent of fifteen hundred rubles (\$300). Though she kept no chickens, she had an annual delivery quota of

five hundred eggs. In place of these, she paid a cash equivalent of five hundred rubles.

After meeting all these obligations last year, she still had more than six hundred rubles left with which to buy fodder for the winter.

Auntie Dasha met her remaining obligations to the state in kind. She filled her meat quota by slaughtering the calf which her cow bore regularly each January. Her private potato patch yielded her six hundred kilograms of potatoes. After delivering her quota of three hundred kilos to the state, this left her with three hundred kilos which was just enough to take care of herself and Grisha through the coming year.

In the fall, she received a load of hay and a large bag of turnips from the collective farm as payment for her work days. The collective farm chairman, whose house had a new tin roof, had explained at a members' meeting just why that year the collective farm was in no position to pay off in grain or cash.

But his arithmetic was way over Auntie Dasha's head, and anyway she was thankful for the hay.

All in all, it had been a fairly good year. She had rented the front part of her house to my family for the summer for eight hundred rubles. Even after paying the fifty per cent tax on "unearned" revenue, this would give her money for shoes for the winter.

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potato quotas, but with no cow her butter quota would cut. With no calf to slaughter, she would discharge her milk quota with cash. But with fresh eggs bringing as high as fifteen or even sixteen rubles (about \$3) for ten on the open market, she thought she still might do better if she shifted from a dairy to a poultry economy.

Trotsky once loftily described the peasant as the paragon of civilization. He wanted to express his appreciation of the peasant's economic role, plus his contempt for the docility with which the peasant allowed himself to be exploited under the old regime.

Since then the whole structure of society has been transformed. But the new regime has evolved techniques for squeezing the peasant far more thoroughly than those of the old-time landlords. Save in certain pampered areas like the Georgian citrus groves or the rich wheatlands of the Kuban Cossack country, the peasant has yet to reap most of the benefits enjoyed by the urban intellectual and working classes.

The money the peasantry collected from high food prices in wartime was canceled by the currency reform. The obligations to the state in kind and money have been upped from year to year. Consumer goods abundant in the cities have yet to reach most rural areas, and prices to the peasant are higher.

It is hard to generalize about living standards of the peasantry in such an enormous country. Conditions vary with the texture of the soil and the resourcefulness of the people. Economic changes, too, including changes for the better, can take place in the Soviet Union with dramatic suddenness.

One day the government may unexpectedly relax the pressure on the peasantry. Till then, there will be millions of Auntie Dashas pondering whether to trade their cows for chickens or vice versa.

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## V

WHAT IT'S LIKE  
TO SHOP IN MOSCOW

THE WOMEN'S galoshes department in Moscow's mammoth "Mostorg" store was the scene of scrimmage. Women of all ages and condition, with a sprinkling of men sandwiched in among them, were battling, shoving, and pushing their way toward the counter with a courage and determination worthy of a noble cause. Outside, the police had roped off the entrance and were admitting new customers only one at a time from a line that curled twice round the block.

The time was late December, 1947, yet the sudden run on galoshes had *nothing to do with the weather*. The currency reform and the end of rationing had just been decreed. Old rubles were being converted at the rate of 10 to 1. But the price of women's galoshes had just been slashed 90 per cent, from 1400 rubles (\$264) to 140 rubles (26.40). Those who could put their money into galoshes, therefore, had the pleasant sensation of somehow beating devaluation.

The run on galoshes continued for a week. Then the authorities stepped in. There was a round up of speculators who were marketing galoshes in the provinces at several times the legal price. The sale of galoshes in all stores was suspended temporarily.

Contrary to general expectations, when the galoshes counters reopened a few days later, the price had not been raised.

stocks were maintained despite a renewed buying rush, which soon subsided. The government had won an important round in its campaign to establish consumer confidence in its new price policy.

From that time on there have been several cuts in retail prices. The reductions have been more marked in certain lines than in others. On the whole, foodstuffs have been most affected, also certain high priced non-essentials, such as radios, cameras and motorcycles.

Reductions in food prices range from 10 to 15 per cent and on some of the other items mentioned as high as 30 per cent. Clothing prices, too, have come down somewhat, though here the drop has been less marked compared with the original price lists published at the end of rationing. At the same time there has been a steady improvement in stocks and selections, and the results are most noticeable in the appearance of a Moscow city crowd, the women especially.

While domestic production of consumer goods is expanding steadily, much of the present variety is provided by imported goods—Czechoslovak first and foremost. Moscow stores offer a wide choice of attractive Czech one and two-piece printed dresses, ranging in price around 350 rubles (about \$70). Cotton blouses, produced locally, cost from 60 rubles (\$11.30) up. Rayon stockings range from 35 rubles (\$6.80) to 70 rubles (\$13.60) a pair. Nylons are not yet on public sale.

Ready made suits for men start at about 600 rubles (\$113), ranging up to 2000 rubles (\$377). Men's shirts begin at 60 rubles (\$11.30). Leather shoes retail for from 250 rubles (\$47.10) to 400 rubles (\$75.40), but canvas slippers may be had for 50 rubles (\$9.40) a pair.

Besides clothing and footwear, Czechoslovakia also is the



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source of a wide range of notions and accessories, including handbags, gloves, belts, and brief cases. In fact, I have heard Czech visitors to Russia remark wryly there were more Czech goods available in Moscow than in Prague.

The Soviet authorities are aware of such sensitiveness, and when Czech "cultural" groups visit Moscow, members of Soviet groups entertaining them invariably are cautioned not to wear easily recognizable Czech articles. Polish and German textiles are abundant, though to date these sources have supplied less in the way of finished clothing.

A Soviet made electric vacuum cleaner with all the appliances is on sale for 1200 rubles (\$226), also two sizes of Soviet electric refrigerators, at the equivalent of \$565 and \$1360, respectively.

But as far as most customers are concerned, these are just showroom samples of better days to come when they will have the space and place to use such things as well as the purchase price. You cannot set up a bulky refrigerator in a cramped communal kitchen or do much with a vacuum cleaner on two square yards of rug space in one room.

Similar considerations restrict the demand for radio consoles with built in record players at ruble prices that would amount to \$1360 to \$1880. But a wide selection of table radios of Soviet, Czech and German makes, ranging in price from \$47.10 for a one wave set to \$339 for a Telefunken, attracts plenty of trade.

Bicycles of many makes and designs are to be had for from \$136 up to \$377, also motorcycles, beginning at \$680. A four-cylinder Soviet made Moskvich midget car, modeled on the German Opel Olympia, may be had for \$1700, or the medium sized Pobeda for \$3400.

## HOW MUCH GRAFT IN RUSSIAN BUSINESS?

WHEN MANY other contacts with Soviet life were lost to us foreigners, we might still mingle on terms of anonymous humanity with the common people at the market. And marketing became one of the most interesting parts of our Moscow routine.

Moscow housewives are fond of saying, with typical Russian overstatement, that you can even find birds' milk (Russian counterpart of hens' teeth) in the local market-places if only you keep on looking long enough. It is quite true that Moscow's markets offer an endless variety of wares and human experience.

At one stall a swarthy Caucasian in a broad-crowned hunchulla hat invariably presides over a mixed suitcase cargo of oranges, lemons and bay leaves. The oranges are sorted according to size in two piles. The larger ones sell for fifteen rubles apiece, the smaller ones for ten rubles. The lemons cost eight rubles each and the bay leaves one ruble for a bunch of three or four leaves.

To customers who protest his prices, the seller explains in heavily accented Russian that he has to pay his round trip train fare and that all he could bring was what he could stow in a couple of suitcases. Russians like oranges and lemons, and bay leaves are essential ingredients for any

groups, for Russians prize quality. Moreover, whatever the Russian earns he usually spends. In a country where there are no invested fortunes, money no longer is regarded as more than a medium of exchange.

The government stores displayed melons and grapes shipped from Central Asia, blue plums and apricots from the Ukraine. Viewing its profusion, one appreciative customer remarked that Moscow indeed was the bride of all the Russias. However, we saw much the same picture in Leningrad and the few other places we were allowed to visit.

Meat also was abundant in the market. Good cuts of beef at thirty-two rubles a kilo, lamb at thirty five rubles, pork at forty-two rubles. Veal sold for as little as eighteen rubles a kilo. But the quality of the meat varied greatly and ability to pick and choose was essential. All these prices were from ten to fifteen per cent lower than the year before.

In addition to its many produce markets, Moscow has other specialized markets, like the Yaroslavsky, where persons congregate to buy and sell second hand clothes, and where it is considered inadvisable to be seen too often as the crowd is well sprinkled with plain-clothes agents of the anti speculation squad.

The Dubininsky is a mart for everything conceivable in the way of hardware and machinery, from screw drivers, monkey wrenches and radio tubes to second hand automobiles.

But for us, and for the children especially, most fascinating of all was the Bird Market, also called the Cow Market. There, once a week, on Sundays only, every extant form of animal life is bought and sold, from cattle and horses to turtles and parakeets. The range includes dogs of every breed and combination, few of them pedigreed, kittens, piglets, fox cubs, wolf cubs, porcupines, rabbits, squirrels, white mice, caged songbirds and aquarium fish.

Then on a Sunday, congregates the whole guild of dedi-

s chee or borsch worthy of the name (S chee is cabbage soup with all kinds of vegetables and herbs mixed in, and topped with sour cream Borsch is a consomme soup with beets and sour cream)

So the customers buy one orange or lemon and one bunch of bay leaves per head, though they grumble that soon the same items will be available in government shops for a mere fraction of the price

Oranges, lemons and bay leaves are not the only items that fluctuate violently in price according to season When the first pale green hothouse gherkin sized cucumbers appear in government shops late in February, they cost two rubles apiece. Presently, the price drops to one ruble By June, the open market is glutted with ripe field cucumbers at three rubles a kilogram

Early in the summer peasants with their own produce to sell got five and even six rubles a kilo for new potatoes Then the government stepped in with whole truckloads selling for one ruble a kilo The price of tomatoes plummeted from twenty five rubles a kilo at the start of the season to three rubles and fifty kopecks by the end of July when they were available in government stores In the same period fresh cabbage dropped from eight rubles to two rubles a kilo

The law of supply and demand thus continues to operate in the Soviet open market much as under a free economy,

markets the summer of 1947 was a joy to behold The stalls sagged beneath the weight of wild and cultivated strawberries, cherries, raspberries, blueberries, and mushrooms

now in every major city Moscow's palatial Gastronom No 1, commonly called "Yeliseyev's" after the former proprietor, displays varieties of smoked sausage, salami, smoked meats, meat loaf, smoked and salted fish, game, fowl, fancy breads, and pastry, not to mention ten or twelve varieties of caviar, scarcely equaled by the finest New York caterer. The Leningrad Gastronom is equally impressive.

It is a steep drop from the level of these luxury stores to that of the neighborhood shops where most of the people trade. However, a pattern for the future has been set. Prices on such items as sausage range between fifty and ninety rubles a kilo, on the smoked fish between forty and eighty rubles, fowl and game between twenty and twenty five rubles. The best grades of bread cost five rubles a kilo, cake costs upward of twenty rubles a kilo. The best grades of caviar cost two hundred and thirty rubles a kilo, and the Gastronom stocks only the best of everything.

The shortcomings of Soviet trade are a favorite target for Soviet "self-criticism." Nothing conveys to the average Soviet citizen-consumer the impression the government really has his interests at heart more than these frequent and candid ribbings of corruption and inefficiency in the wholesale and retail distribution systems. Seldom, however, does censorship permit their transmission abroad.

In publishing such unsavory material, the Soviet press invariably absolves the Soviet system of any blame or responsibility. The abuses involved are pictured as "capitalist survivals," the inference being that they presently will be outlawed.

This picture is correct in the sense that government trade organizations have tended to attract persons who once were in ~~positions of~~ either before the revolution or during the





tention, he merely chopped the wings off the cherubs and Cupids, tied red kerchiefs around their necks—and tried to palm them off as statues of “young pioneers.”

Besides bad management, petty grafting is fairly common in Soviet retail trade. One of the favorite practices judging by press reports, is for a store manager to mark up certain highly salable items just a fraction above the authorized retail price. He then splits the difference with his bookkeeper and sales force. Such cases are small stuff compared to the full-dress public scandals that are aired from time to time.

A year or so ago, the Moscow newspaper, *Trud* broke the story of a large ring of speculators operating in and around the state jewelry merchandising organization known as “Yuveltorg.” It began with a raid by the anti speculation squad on a big jewelry store on the Petrovka, sometimes called Moscow’s Fifth Avenue. The police arrested seventeen persons and seized two million rubles worth of valuables in this first haul.

The technique employed by the speculators was simplicity itself. They stationed contact men outside the various Yuveltorg shops. Private citizens who came to sell their valuables to the store would then be approached with offers to buy their watches, jewelry, or gold coins, privately. If they agreed the articles thus acquired would be either resold directly to private customers or else turned in to Yuveltorg. In either instance, the ring made a handsome profit.

One trick was to buy broken watches at a low price and sell them to the government organization at the price authorized for watches in good repair. *Trud* reported that more than two thousand defective watches were thus foisted onto the government at a profit of more than one million

NEP (New Economic Policy) period, when private trade was legalized for a time. Many of these persons, having endured severe personal hardship through confiscation and expropriation, are secretly antagonistic to the Soviet system—and privately bent on recouping part of their losses.

At the same time, much of the waste and inefficiency the papers inveigh against stems directly from absence in the government trade system of the commercial competitive element which operates as a powerful corrective to incompetence under a free economy.

No Soviet government trade organization can go bankrupt, no matter how mismanaged—unless the government as a whole goes bankrupt. Moreover, by eliminating the profit motive from trade, the Soviet trade system tends to deprive management and sales personnel of the main incentive toward greater effort and efficiency.

This is no hypothetical argument. One may see the results on every side, in the prevailing slovenly nature of the window displays, in the indifference of sales clerks toward customers (model stores excepted), in buying stock without reference to consumer demand.

One roving reporter, for example, calculated that it would take the local toy stores in the town of Baku three thousand years to dispose of their present supply of jack in the boxes. He also told how the local pharmacy trust, unable to dispose of its stocks of tooth powder, finally sold the lot as ceiling whitewash.

Another story dealt with the leading Kiev art shop, which, instead of supplying the public demand for busts of Lenin, Stalin, and other Soviet leaders, glutted its shelves with plaster cherubs and Cupids. When the "apolitical" bourgeois character of these exhibits was called to the

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the Moscow press have centered around such fabulous figures as the "button king," who cornered the button supply, short-circuiting the legitimate state channels, and the "mouse king," who built up a million-ruble private business breeding white mice, which he sold to state laboratories.

All this suggests that some private enterprise—even although it is of an underground nature—petrifies in Soviet Russia at this present stage of development.



growth of both consumer and producer or artisan co-operatives. It was hoped the co-operatives would tap reserves of foodstuffs, raw materials, and labor power not reached by state enterprise. The consumer co-operatives, for example, were authorized to purchase surplus foodstuffs from peasants and collective farmers who, owing to distance or lack of transportation, could not market them on their own.

The producer or artisan co-operatives were intended primarily to increase supplies of consumer goods, using local materials and the labor power of home workers (*nadomniki*), artisans, and handicraftsmen, otherwise hard to integrate into Soviet industry, with its stress on mass-production methods.

It further was hoped that the competition of the co-operatives might serve as a stimulus to state enterprise.

In theory, at least, the *artel* leaves a certain legitimate scope for private initiative. Once the obligations of the *artel* to the state have been fulfilled—whether in the form of produce, manufactured goods, or trade turnover taxes—the members are free to dispose of any surplus as they wish.

This is just one illustration of how the Soviets sometimes smuggle in through the back door concepts they have rejected and condemned publicly.

In practice, the co-operatives have provided plenty of opportunity for private initiative, but not always in accord with the Kremlin's intentions. Some months ago the Tashkent paper, *Pravda Vostoka*, with rare candor, summed up the situation:

"Private entrepreneurs, businessmen, and speculators have found a broad field for anti state activity in the co-operative system of the republic. Using the co-operatives as a front and ~~concealing~~ their resources, they have fleeced the con-



## RUSSIAN CO-OPERATIVES —NOT QUITE IN STEP

ALONGSIDE the economic main stream of state ownership and management, the Soviet system permits the existence of consumer co-operatives and producer or artisan co-operatives. As a legal entity, the co-operative is closely akin to the collective farm, the determining factor being property relations.

Both the collective farm and co-operative are classified as *artels*, "voluntary" associations of small holders or producers who have pooled their assets and implements. Their "voluntary" nature is underscored invariably, even though the choice generally is between economic and, possibly, physical extinction and conformity.

The *artel* members, having given up individual titles to their property, still retain collective ownership as shareholders in the common enterprise. This is what differentiates the collective farm or *kolkhoz* from the state farm or *sovkhoz*, and likewise distinguishes the consumer and producer or artisan co-operatives from state enterprise.

Because of the collective ownership vested in the members, as opposed to complete nationalization, the *artel* is considered a transitional form, between private and state ownership.

Since the war, the Soviet government<sup>1</sup> has urged the

growth of both consumer and producer or artisan co-operatives. It was hoped the co-operatives would tap reserves of foodstuffs, raw materials, and labor power not reached by state enterprise. The consumer co-operatives, for example, were authorized to purchase surplus foodstuffs from peasants and collective farmers who, owing to distance or lack of transportation, could not market them on their own.

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sumer on an extensive scale, misappropriated public funds, undermined the economic and financial condition of the co-operatives, and inflicted enormous losses on the state."

Illustrating how these entrepreneurs operated, the same source reports how the head of a butcher co-operative used his position in order to buy meat at government wholesale prices, which he then resold in his own private store for five rubles above the legal retail price.

In another instance, at three lunchrooms belonging to the Thaelmann Co-operative, all the equipment, including the samovars, crockery, tables, and benches, was owned by the respective managers, who sold their own foodstuffs without turning in a kopeck to the co-operative.

At a town on the shore of the landlocked Aral Sea, the paper found that the managers of the local fried fish co-operatives had other fish to fry. Behind the co-operative front, *Pravda Vostoka* complained, 'they themselves buy the fish, fry it, and sell it.' One such capitalist fishmonger was reported to have built up a business with a monthly turnover of one hundred thousand rubles.

In Moscow, the scale of such operations naturally is larger than in outlying areas, and one of the largest operators was a certain V. A. Kantsel. This worthy obtained the approval of a district school board to set up a co-operative workshop ostensibly for the manufacture of school supplies. Though officially the undertaking employed only three persons, in his heyday Kantsel had three hundred persons working for him—and several officials of the school board were on his payroll in various fictitious capacities.

The legitimate production of school supplies accounted for less than ten per cent of Kantsel's productive activity—

this was for the sake of appearances. The remaining ninety per cent went into the manufacture of a diversified line of pennants, games, novelties, small souvenirs, and picture postcards, all of them marketed privately on the side—"on the left," as the Russians say. On the days of big football (soccer) games at Moscow's capacious Dynamo Stadium, Kantsel and his aides would arrive on the scene with a large unfolding display case and do a brisk and lucrative trade in postcard photos of the leading players and kerchiefs and pennants with the colors of the various teams.

Kantsel's enterprise thrived until one morning the law caught up with him. The premises were padlocked and the ringleaders marched off to prison.

Not only does the Soviet penal code classify as crimes activities which in Western countries come under the category of legitimate commerce, but the workman who does a minor repair job privately and keeps the money thus earned for himself, also is liable to prosecution.

From Kiev comes the story of a member of a wounded war veterans' repairmen's co-operative named Henbaum. According to the Kiev paper *Pravda Ukraïny*, Henbaum made a habit of taking private orders for repair of kitchen utensils and electrical appliances and keeping the money he received in payment. Moreover, complains the paper, though many people knew of this, nobody did anything to check his career of crime, until the revenue authorities learned of it and had Henbaum arrested.

Despite the risk involved, most Russian workmen prefer to work on the side—"on the left"—whenever they can. In Russia, if you want your kerosene stove fixed, your watch repaired, your roof mended, your room painted, or any other

job done properly, you will find it wiser to deal with the workman directly. Even if you are a good party member, you will see no harm in it!

When a Russian friend of ours wanted his piano tuned and renovated, he phoned a piano tuner co-operative which advertised in the Moscow evening paper. The tuner they sent to look over the job gave him a price of two hundred and fifty rubles. When the customer winced, the tuner explained that if he didn't mind waiting a few days, he himself would do the job privately, on his own time, for one hundred and fifty rubles. Without further ado, the customer paid the fifteen ruble call charge. The workman turned this money into his co-operative, together with the explanation that the customer had decided not to go ahead with the job.

As far as the co-operative was concerned, the matter ended there. A few days later, the tuner went to our friend's flat, and in the course of a few evenings fixed the piano. He pocketed his one hundred and fifty rubles, and nobody was the wiser.

## VIII

# LABOR UNIONS ARE SPEED-UP UNIONS

THE POST WAR PERIOD has brought little relaxation to the Russians. Everyone who works, down to the last ditch digger, is being prodded and cajoled constantly into working a faster pitch. Gone is the prewar prating about cutting the prevailing eight hour day to seven hours. Today the man who refuses to "volunteer" for overtime is looked upon as "unpatriotic," and nobody likes to be called that.

One of the main agencies, but by no means the only agency, for getting the Soviet worker to work harder and longer, is the Soviet trade union. The Soviet trade union has nothing in common but the name with trade unionism as conceived and practiced in Western countries. The sole similarity is with some old time company unions.

While on paper the Soviet trade unions are pledged to represent and defend the workers' interests vis-a-vis management in all disputes, including wage issues, and while all sorts of clauses on rights of appeal and arbitration are written in the charters, these provisions have about as much meaning and application as the civil liberties guaranteed in the Soviet Constitution. The actual power of decision resides elsewhere, beyond recourse. The strike

—WCA Labor's effective defense against arbitrary power

is as utterly outlawed as it was in Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy

As against this fictitious purpose the real purpose of the Soviet trade unions is to assist the government in getting as much work as is humanly possible out of Soviet workers. They function primarily as an enormous well-oiled nation wide machine for transmitting to the great working masses the endless official ballyhoo campaigns aimed at keeping the worker constantly pepped up so that he will exert his utmost effort.

The trade unions are the organizers and sponsors of the Stakhanovite or socialist competition movement, the principle of which is to get the workers competing with each other to work better and harder. Trade union meetings are held at which speeches are made, resolutions passed, challenges issued from one brigade or worker to another to outdo each other.

To keep things from lapsing into routine a whole military vocabulary is employed. One constantly is regaled with victories on the production front of "battles for lower production costs for economy of raw materials fuel or electricity, and now, in particular for improved quality. The whole effort is stage managed by local trade-union leaders acting on directives from the trade union center.

The scale of this sustained effort is indicated by the official claim that ninety per cent of all Soviet industrial workers and technicians take part in socialist competition. The *Literary Gazette* with a flair for literary phrase, enthuses: "In our country the Stakhanovite movement has flowered with a lush bloom—a great army of people tasking with their souls with ardor making their daily contribution to the common cause."

Every year produces its new crop of much publicized stars of socialist competition, individuals who are built up as shining examples for the working rank and file to emulate. Some years, the emphasis is on quantity, other years on quality. Last year's campaign stressed quality, and its main hero was a Moscow textile loom operator named Alexander Chutkikh. He was credited with having achieved spectacular improvement in the quality of his cloth. The Soviet press promptly took him up and he was blazoned from Kaliningrad to Vladivostok as "Initiator of the struggle for high grade weaves." Soon he was showered with honors, including a Stalin Prize.

Pressed by admirers for the story of his signal success, Chutkikh confided in a published article that "it was all quite simple." One morning, saddened by the news that consumers were grumbling about the quality of cloth, he decided to investigate for himself. He made the rounds of the shops. In one place a woman flung a bolt of cloth down on the counter and walked out. Chutkikh examined the bolt and found himself agreeing with the disgruntled customer. The cloth was of curious hue, with an ugly pattern.

Then and there Chutkikh had his flash of inspiration. "It suddenly came to me that competition for increase in quantity of manufactured goods must be supplemented with competition for excellence of quality. At a meeting of factory Stakhanovites I suggested organizing brigades for excellent quality. I was seconded. My unit became the first in the plant to produce first grade cloth. The newspapers wrote it up.

That was all there was to it. Thereafter, continued Chutkikh, the letters started pouring in. People I had never met wrote me asking advice wanting to know what they should





another, the methods, slogans, and clichés have scarcely altered since the whole movement was initiated in 1935 with the Donbas miner, Alexei Stakhanov

This does not imply that the concerted ballyhoo fails in its purpose of making people work harder. But the attempt to present the whole performance as "spontaneous" and initiated by the rank and file is as fishy as a can of caviar. The result—in great output or better quality—is achieved by the sheer concerted drive and overwhelming impact of a mighty and unopposed propaganda machine. The Soviet trade-unions, backed by the Communist party, the Soviet government, and the entire press, comprise its vital cog.

The workers, engineers and technicians conform, though the whole thing is, of course, strictly "voluntary." They well know the price of nonconformity.

The role of Soviet trade-unions as promoters of Soviet patriotism and communism is set forth in a new treatise on trade union status, adopted at the recent All Union Trade Union Congress.

While the statute specifies that trade unions are non party organizations to which workers belong irrespective of race, nationality, sex, or religious convictions, it specifically recognizes the leading political role of the Communist party.

The statute sets forth that the trade unions will assist in the plan for fulfillment of quotas, reduction of production costs, and improvement of quality.

To these ends, the trade unions are pledged to "organize socialist competition of workers and employees," and to facilitate adoption of a piece rate and progressive premium system in wages. The statute authorizes them to conclude collective agreements with management.

The rights listed for trade union members include the

do in order to produce only high-quality goods. There were hundreds of such letters. Boatmen, road builders, butter makers, and metal workers all wanted the same thing—to turn out excellent products so as not to blush before the Soviet consumer."

Just what magic "open sesame" Chutikh dispensed in reply to these queries is not clear, either from his own statement or from the voluminous press publicity. Perhaps it is a state secret. At any event, overnight almost, the Soviet press reported "Alexander Chutikh Brigades" were being formed spontaneously, all over the country, and even in Bulgaria, by his ardent emulators.

Though Chutikh held the center of the limelight, he did not monopolize it. Numerous other model workers got their names and pictures in the papers, all of which moved the *Literary Gazette* to contrast this "Soviet glorification of the toiling man" with America, where it charged only gangsters like Al Capone are so celebrated. Presumably, there is no intent to imply that racketeering was involved in both cases.

The stars of 'socialist competition' are strictly one season wonders retired to oblivion as soon as the novelty wears off. Year before last, a similar fuss was made over Alexander Matrosov, credited with achieving no less sensational improvements in the production of shoes by leather and time saving proposals which, when described sounded elementary to the point of naivete. Today, Matrosov is as forgotten as other model workers before him.

A salient and laudable aspect of the 'Stakhanovite' campaigns is their stress on the importance of developing and encouraging innovations. But the campaigns themselves seem sadly in need of a bit of innovating. Though the stars change and the focal point shifts from history to —

HOW INDUSTRIALIZED  
IS RUSSIA?

**S**OVIET INDUSTRIALIZATION has rolled ahead with gathering momentum ever since the war.

Not only have wartime losses been made good, but today Soviet industry is far more diversified and better equipped technically than ever before. Quality improvements have occurred in almost every line.

Available percentage figures indicate a geometric increase in production of farm machinery—tractors, harvester combines, reapers, cultivators, and even such refinements as potato diggers and cotton pickers. At Stalingrad, top priority was given to the reconstruction of the great tractor plant which in wartime turned out tanks up until the moment the first German assault wave tossed hand grenades through the windows.

Less successful than in some other fields have been Soviet attempts to mass produce washing machines.

A glowing account of a Soviet-designed sample model confirmed the impression that the Soviets had more or less duplicated, if not invented, the original washing machine. It was described as a zinc lined tank with a spherical drum

right to criticize local and higher-up trade union officials, and to appeal to the union for redress against managerial abuses.

Duties of members include strict observance of labor discipline, conservation of public socialist property, improvement of personal skill and productive capacity, observance of the statute, and regular payment of dues fixed at one per cent of actual earnings.

The statute declares, "in the Soviet Union, the exploiting classes are completely liquidated, exploitation of man by man ended forever, and unemployment abolished."

The statute obligates unions to take a special interest in the welfare of women, "promoting their participation" in "state productive and social life" as well as in the "Communist education of children."

The statute also states that the unions shall "develop a feeling of proletarian internationalism and fight for the unity of the international labor movement, for enduring peace, and democracy throughout the world."

In an accompanying resolution, the Trade Union Congress recorded its support of Soviet foreign policy and expressed the "warmest gratitude" to the Soviet government for supporting World Federation of Trade-Union proposals before the United Nations. The congress approved the All-Union Trade Union Council's international activity in favor of the WFTU and against "splitters of the international labor movement."

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with a lopsided wobble when the electric motor was switched on

There also was a manually operated version with a crank instead of a motor. On the better models a gas burner under the tank kept the water warm.

Mass production of this triumph of Soviet ingenuity originally was scheduled for early spring, 1949.

Before the war, the country had only two important automobile plants, the Stalin plant in Moscow and the Molotov plant in Gorky. Both turned out sturdy standardized trucks. The Gorky plant, in addition, mass produced the M 1, a fairly serviceable version of the 1933 Ford, while the Stalin plant produced the ZIS 101, a rather unwieldy, seven passenger, eight-cylinder job.

I recall that the General Motors representative, who in those days was permitted to visit Moscow on business from time to time, after a careful inspection of the ZIS 101 assembly line, estimated that each unit must cost about seventy-five thousand dollars to produce.

Postwar successor to the ZIS 101 is the ZIS 110. During the war, many of the Stalin plant's engineers and designers visited the United States, and the ZIS 110 is a tribute to their power of observation. Basically it is a 1942 Packard (Stalin's favorite make).

The ZIS 110 is a high-class automobile in every respect as regards design, workmanship and quality of materials. As its production never has exceeded two a day, it is essentially a custom built automobile.

The greatest postwar production achievement of the  
 the Molotov plant in Gorky

the ZIS 110 (Victory),  
 produced at

more tractors, self propelled combines, trucks, and automobiles roll off assembly lines

Yet even now supply is barely abreast of demands, and the scarcity of lubricants, in particular, has led to extensive efforts to save and refine used motor oil

Meanwhile, production at Russia's oldest and largest Baku field is slowly but surely beginning to lag as well after well runs dry

Vast, uncharted oil reserves probably exist somewhere beneath the U.S.S.R. subsoil, but prospecting so far has still to locate them, although year by year increasing funds and effort are concentrated on the search

Some new strikes have been made from time to time. A few years ago, deposits discovered at Ishumbai in Bashkiria, close to the borderline between Europe and Asia, were hailed as many times larger than Russia's oldest and biggest Baku field. From the outset this area was referred to as 'the second Baku'

Though it has developed, in fact, into the Soviet's second largest domestic oil source, initial forecasts that within a decade it would surpass the original Baku field have not been justified

At the original Baku field, meanwhile, no attempt is being spared to bolster sagging production. A large new prospecting organization was formed there two years ago to step up the search for new reserves in neighboring areas and at deeper levels in the old fields, and new techniques were introduced to re-exploit abandoned wells

Despite this, last year's output fell 63 per cent short of plan fulfillment

In his report to the local party congress of recent date, M. D. Ramonov, Secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist

Every smart Soviet factory manager keeps on hand a surplus of easy to produce stop gap items on which he can draw whenever required to cover a production lag in a more complex line

To give an illustration, the Soviet state organization for distributing textiles offered a certain sewing workshop 220 000 rubles' worth of high grade poplin for the manufacture of men's shirts. The shop director refused the consignment on the grounds that shirtmaking was fussy and unprofitable—he preferred fulfilling his plan by cutting and hemstitching handkerchiefs—despite an acute shortage of shirts in the selfsame town

To fix the responsibility of management for quality of output and production efficiency, all Soviet industry is being transferred to strict cost accounting. State subsidies on which management in the past could rely to rescue it from the red, are being done away with

This new departure actually is a return to more conservative business methods, and another example of Communist readiness to borrow from capitalism when it serves the purpose

## 2

**S**HORTAGE of gasoline and Diesel and lubricating oils is likely to become the most crucial gap in Soviet economy unless new and rich deposits are found—and found soon

Consumption of these petroleum products is scheduled to rise astronomically in the immediate future as mass and

more tractors, self propelled combines, trucks, and automobiles roll off assembly lines

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Despite this, last year's output fell 6.3 per cent short of plan fulfillment

In his report to the local party congress of recent date, M. D. BAKHCHIVAN, Secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist

party, laid the blame for this lag on the new prospecting organization, which, he said, had failed to fulfill its plan for finding new reserves. He further upbraided the heads of the Baku oil trust for not doing enough, by means of compression and other methods, to flog the last drops of oil from the tired old wells.

Another speaker at the congress concurred with Mr. Bagirov and charged the prospectors lacked "proper geological guidance." He urged them to carry their search for oil farther out to sea beneath the waters of the Caspian.

Efforts to increase output at Russia's second oldest oil fields at Grozny in the North Caucasus also have failed so far because of limited and declining reserves.

The Emba oil fields on the northeastern shores of the Caspian which have been exploited for the past fifty years, reached their all time production peak in the wartime year of 1943, when output climbed forty-one per cent above the 1940 figure. Since then, there has been a sharp decline, which local party spokesmen likewise ascribe to failure of the prospectors to find new deposits and to lack of intensive exploitation of the old wells.

The search for oil has also been going on in Uzbekistan, where, according to local party sources, small deposits have been located at several points, giving grounds for hope that large reserves may also be located. Some eighty wells have been sunk so far.

Elsewhere in Central Asia, minor deposits have been found in the Djalal Abad area of Kirghizia. But here, too, prospecting and exploitation are far from meeting their goals.

In his recent report to the Ukrainian Party Congress, Secretary General Nikita Khrushchev



This situation also explains why the Soviet government casts a roving and covetous eye on foreign sources of oil. It is not hard to imagine the Kremlin's chagrin when the oil-concession deal in northern Iran fell through.

Hence, the growing Soviet interest in the oil rich Middle East, the total absorption of the Roumanian output and elimination of British and American interests from the Roumanian fields, the steadfast determination with which the Soviets cling to the Zistersdorf oil fields in Austria, their keen interest in developing synthetic oil production and, finally, the recent sharp cut in gasoline deliveries to East Germany.

Many observers consider Russia's oil weakness which has been accentuated by industrial developments, one of the most cogent reasons in the Kremlin against risking a large scale war at present.

THE SOVIETS have scored their most impressive postwar gains in the reconstruction of devastated areas and in lifting industrial production beyond the prewar peak.

According to official sources, 407,000 rural dwellings were built in the invaded portions of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (Russia proper) in the three year period from 1946 through 1948, as well as 189,000 farm buildings. In the Ukraine, which was completely overrun, 800,000 rural dwellings were rebuilt or restored, and 200,000 farm buildings, in the same period.

Nineteen forty-eight's grain harvest totaled seven billion poods (a pood is 36 pounds), almost equaling the 1940 bumper figure. In industry, some four thousand factories, plants and mines started or resumed production during the single year of 1943. The total industrial output for the same year was given as eighteen per cent above the 1940 level and twenty seven per cent over the previous year, 1947.

In war-devastated areas, the 1948 advance over 1947 was given as forty-one per cent, the gain being largely the result of restoration of some of the big Donbas industrial units destroyed or put out of action during the war.

The rest



ess whereby the percentages are computed, the indices and standards of comparison used, including what adjustments, if any, for the revaluation of the ruble at the end of 1947—are closely kept secrets of the central statistical administration of the *Council of Ministers of the USSR*.

Aside from an understandable withholding of production data which, though public property in most countries, might give a clue to the Soviet Union's war potential, the Russians are even coy about the output of the most peaceful consumer goods. Figures on the production of textiles, galoshes or sausages are scarcely more available than figures on the output of tanks or planes.

Without the statistical key, the percentages given in the plan fulfillment reports are a sort of statistical cipher, more mystifying than enlightening, and this doubtless is just how these reports are intended by their devisers.

The one important exception to the percentage method of presentation is the annual national budget, presented regularly each spring to the Supreme Soviet for approval.

Here, instead of percentages, one has millions and billions of rubles to conjure with. But the categories are so general where economic matters are concerned—there is no breakdown of the global figure assigned to industry, for example—and the price equivalents are so nebulous that the budget supplies scarcely any more hard information on the Soviet economy than the plan fulfillment reports.

The most that can be said for the budget is that it gives some indication of expenditure and sources of revenue, as well as of capital investment, plus some fairly specific data on cultural activities, education, and social services.

Oddly, the national budget makes no provision for foreign trade in either its income or expenditure section.

though foreign trade is a state monopoly Nor will the student glean the least information on this subject from any published Soviet source. In this respect, imports of Bata shoes from Czechoslovakia are cloaked in the same hush hush as imports of uranium from that neighboring country

The same statistical blackout applies to Soviet takings from eastern Germany in the form of reparations from current production Yet in such lines as automobiles and electrical equipment alone the figures must run into millions of rubles, all of it clear gain On the streets of any Soviet city today the standard German BMW (Bavarian Motor Works) two-door sedans produced in the east zone outnumber cars of any other single make

All this ultra secretiveness is largely a postwar development. Before the war, detailed data on a wide range of subjects were published by the State Planning Commission and other government agencies

No data at all in any size, shape or form, are ever published on Soviet "penal corrective labor" enterprises, though these enterprises, operated by the MVD, are doubtless, to say the least, a far from negligible factor in Soviet economy

As with everything the Soviets approach statistics from the standpoint of the party line and its requirements The statisticians generally are told ahead of time what their figures are to show and often if the figures do not add up to the required answer, so much the worse for the figures and for the statisticians who compile them.

A graphic illustration of this attitude was provided by the suppression of the 1937 census. Instead of releasing the findings the papers charged that counter revolutionary wreckers had wormed their way into the Census Bureau and doctored the figures. According to the grapevine, the trouble

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was that the query on religious beliefs included in the census questionnaire had disclosed an alarmingly high proportion of believers. At any event, in 1939 a new census was taken with this question omitted.

The findings of the 1939 census were published, something which scarcely could happen today, for the Soviet government, in its present frame of mind, is likely to consider vital statistics a state secret.

At any event, there have been no more censuses announced, and despite the great demographical changes wrought by war, including the annexation of large territories with added millions of inhabitants, Soviet economists and sociologists writing for publication still must use the 1939 census figures. In like manner, the authorities so far have even refused to permit publication of a post war Moscow telephone directory, though the 1939 edition by now is useless.

Any attempt to pursue the matter of Soviet statistics further than the authorized published material or achieve some intelligible breakdown would come under the category of economic espionage, subject to swift and severe penalties under the new Soviet catch all law for safeguarding state secrets.

This situation makes it rather hard for students of economy or sociology outside closed party schools, where the pupils have been carefully checked and double-checked by the MVD. Yet this is just one of many Soviet barriers to that free flow of thought and knowledge so essential to human progress.

As for the foreign correspondent, even data from published Soviet sources are often deleted from his dispatches.

## SIBERIA—HIDING PLACE OF RUSSIAN INDUSTRY

FOR FIVE HUNDRED YEARS, pioneering Russians have pushed the frontiers of settlement east toward the vast untapped areas of Siberia and north into the frozen Arctic. World War II gave tremendous impetus to this historic trend by transplanting whole industries bodily from areas threatened with invasion to the secure fastness of the Urals and the endless country beyond.

Today, the eastward shift in the Soviets' economic gravity center continues unabated. The strategic lessons of the war have been thoroughly mastered. The northern areas also are being developed.

In the Siberian Kuzbas (Kuznetsk coal basin), in Central Asia, the Far East and Far North, vast, new, self sufficient industrial centers are being built up with sources of raw materials and fuel conveniently located and with labor power and food locally available.

Ground for Magnitogorsk, iron and steel hub of the Urals, first was broken in 1928 at the foot of Magnetic Mountain, a vast, ferrous outcropping whence the city derives both its name and the iron ore for its blast furnaces. In 1939, its population numbered around a hundred and fifty thousand persons. The present estimate is double that number, and it is clear that Magnitogorsk furnaces pour more molten

iron and steel than all the furnaces of czarist Russia combined

A mere infant by comparison with Magnitogorsk is Miass. There, in the wilds of the main range of the Ural Mountains, a new automobile plant was assembled in 1942, mostly from machinery brought on flatcars from the Stalin automobile plant in Moscow, as part of the general wartime evacuation of industry to areas beyond reach of enemy action. With the machinery came personnel.

After the war, most of these were "persuaded" to stay on permanently in the wilderness and the Miass plant continued to expand. Today, it is mass producing several types of trucks and soon will be turning out passenger cars. Meanwhile, a new Soviet city has grown up around the plant.

Many other Moscow enterprises spawned new units to the east in wartime, among them the giant Kaganovich ball bearing plant, which moved many of its shops to the Urals. In Leningrad, the wartime mass industrial exodus has permanently altered the make up of the city, as few of those who left with factories that were evacuated to new places have been permitted to return since.

It is perhaps a curious commentary on the continuity of Russian history that the forebears of the Leningrad evacuees, now compelled to resettle in the wilderness far from their beloved city, were forcibly transplanted by Peter the Great two centuries ago to people his new capital in what was then wilderness.

Another new Ural city that came into being through the war effort was Krasnoturinsk, site of the new giant Dogoslovsky aluminum plant. In the absence of population figures, the size may be gauged from the report that it has twenty grammar schools.





not far from where this river joins the Arctic Ocean. Prior to 1942, the Pechora Basin was uninhabited Arctic tundra, though prospectors had found rich coal seams in the region. When the German invasion of the Donbas area cut off the coal supply, Soviet planners remembered the coal seams of the Pechora Basin. A long branch railway was built in record time across the northern wilds to link the Pechora Basin with the main Soviet rail network. Shafts were sunk and today production is proceeding on a large scale.

The city of Vorkuta came into being concomitantly, and today numbers several tens of thousands of inhabitants, has its own theater of music and drama, and a school of mines. In time, the Pechora coal mines will have a direct connection with the Magnitogorsk area, thereby supplying the Ural steel mills with high grade coking coal.

Another important coal source is Karaganda, in the central Asian republic of Kazakhstan. Coal first was discovered there in the middle of the last century and rights thereto were acquired "in perpetuity" by a merchant named Ushakov. Some thirty five years later, Ushakov's heirs sold their still unexploited concession to a French buyer, who in turn, resold it to a British concern which sunk a single shaft.

Today, production from many scores of shafts amounts to several million tons yearly and geologists calculate the reserves in billions. In 1939, Karaganda had a population of one hundred and sixty six thousand persons. Today, it is over the quarter million mark.

Another important industrial center in Kazakhstan is Balhash, the site of a big copper development.

## MVD—THE "THING" THAT STALKS

**D**URING our last weeks in Moscow, we obtained an unusual close up of how the Soviet police state operates. The protocol and decorum that ordinarily shield foreigners from too-near contact with this Frankenstein—which we came to call the "Thing"—were suspended

that, despite our American passports, we had no more legal rights vis-a-vis the "Thing" than tens of millions of Soviet citizens all around us.

Lenin, in his famed essay, "The State and Revolution," reduced the state apparatus to a common denominator of naked, unchecked coercive power—army plus police force plus prisons—in the hands of the few who impose their will on the helpless multitude. Though Lenin had in mind the czarist state which he was out to destroy, the Soviet police state he established is a carbon copy of this concept.

The Soviet system took over the apparatus of czarist absolutism—the army, police, and, in particular, the prisons and penal settlements. It expanded and refined this heritage to the point where Nicholas I and his *gendarmerie* or Nicholas

Il and his Okhrana (secret police) would seem like easy going amateurs

Czarist absolutism in its heyday never succeeded in fully silencing the defiant voice of freedom. The Russian intellectual giants of the nineteenth century feuded with the government all their lives, and, though subject to various reprisals, never abandoned the field. The present regime never would suffer a Pushkin, a Gogol, a Belinsky, a Stal'tykov-Schedrin, or even a Tolstoy to denounce its tyranny, criticize its injustices, puncture its self inflation, lampoon its hypocrisy.

*It knows how to nip in the bud effectively the least indication of disaffection or rebellion.* The difference between czarist absolutism and the Soviet police state is that when Lenin was sentenced to Siberian exile he was allowed to take his library with him and pursue his revolutionary writings.

Under czarism the individual still enjoyed some legal defenses from the whim of absolutism. Soviet state practice recognizes no inalienable human rights or other limitations to its total monopoly of power.

Reversing the order of the social contract the Soviet state does not derive its powers from delegation from the citizenry, nor is it their creation. The citizens are the creatures of the state, enjoying only such rights and liberties as the state affords them—and these the state is free to abrogate when ever it wishes.

Paradoxically, the Soviet "Stalin" Constitution guarantees a whole list of civil rights—including freedom of press speech, assembly, fair trial, and independence of the courts. But this, like the Soviet free elections and the Soviet Parliament, is unreal window dressing.

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The essence of power is vested in the Ministry of Internal

A current Moscow anecdote concerns Ivan Petrovich, who is sent abroad on "*komandirovka*" (official business assignment). From Warsaw, his first stop, he wires the home office "Long live Poland, free and independent!" Next, from Prague, he telegraphs "Long live Czechoslovakia, free and independent!"

The cables are repeated in the same vein as Petrovich journeys to Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and other satellite countries. Then after a long period of silence, comes a message from Switzerland that reads "Long live Petrovich, free and independent!" That's the last Moscow hears of this particular Ivan according to the anecdote.

To Soviet wives of foreigners, trying for years to join their husbands abroad to husbands struggling to free wives and children whom the Soviets claim, this story has tragic poignancy beyond all humor. To them the Iron Curtain is no abstract Churchillian metaphor, but something very hard and impenetrable.

Let the record tell the story. It includes the names of some three hundred and fifty wives of American citizens who have sought permission to leave the country in the past nine years. Of these, fifteen women married former members of the American Embassy staff in Moscow. Ninety seven of  
— wives of United States Army veterans

it so desires by the simple expedient of arrest, unhampered by habeas corpus

In the Soviet Union nobody every tries to sue the government or contest the legality of its actions. Against the overwhelming weight of absolute power the individual has no legal protection or redress whatever, he is at the mercy of the merciless.

I recall how *Krokodil*, the Soviet humorous weekly, once picked up the story of a life prisoner in an American penitentiary who sued a publisher for damages—and won the case. It was over the publication of his story which the publisher presumably had distorted.

The idea of a man serving a life term sentence winning a court case appealed to *Krokodil's* sense of humor as absurd. Whoever heard of a convict in the Soviet Union winning a court case? The fact that under American laws even a lifer still might have legal rights was beyond *Krokodil's* understanding.

This view of the citizen as state property explains, among other things, the Soviet attitude toward displaced persons of Soviet nationality. The Soviet state demands the right to reclaim its citizens—regardless of whether they themselves wish to be reclaimed.

The Soviets, along with denial of other individual rights, do not recognize for their citizens the right of expatriation. The methods of the police state are nowhere so revealed as in the treatment of Soviet citizens who apply for permission to go abroad.





Apart from the embassy case, the great majority are from former eastern Poland—the Baltic states, Ruthenia or Bessarabia, and were married before 1939—that is to say, before these territories were annexed by the Soviets and Soviet citizenship automatically was conferred on all the inhabitants.

As the Soviet Union never has admitted the right of expatriation, the rule is that Soviet citizens are permitted to go abroad only in the interests of the government. Personal reasons, however compelling, cut no ice with the MVD officials who pass on exit visa applications.

Nevertheless, up until a few years ago one or two Soviet wives of American citizens were let out every year. But since August, 1946 even this trickle has been cut off.

In another move in this direction, on February 15, 1947, the Soviet government issued a decree prohibiting Soviet citizens from marrying foreigners. This grotesque attempt to legislate affairs of the heart is not something the Soviet leaders are proud of or care to advertise, for the announcement was buried in the columns of the *Official Journal* of the Supreme Soviet—something few persons ever read.

To my knowledge, the decree never has been published or referred to in the Soviet press at large. When I mentioned it to Russians their first reaction was one of utter incredulity. When correspondents tried to send the story abroad, it was killed by the censor.

What makes this law especially brutal is the apparent intent to apply it retroactively. Not content with banning future marriages to foreigners, the government seems bent on liquidating such unions as were previously contracted, and not only by forcing husband and wife to live in different



right, to desert the socialist motherland that raised and educated you, for an American!"

If, at this point, the victim shows obvious signs of mental anguish, the inquisitor suddenly relents. "Here, here, citizeness I did not wish to hurt your feelings. I simply was trying to help you with sound advice—not as an official but as an older fellow countryman. Go home—think it over."

At home, the chances are that if the wife happens to live with her parents, and likely as not in the same room, she is the target of constant nagging. Her family choruses:

"It's all very well if you choose to wreck your own life and queer yourself. But you've no right to ruin our lives. By getting yourself mixed up with foreigners, you've brought us all under observation—you'll get us all into trouble. It's time to put an end to it. Forget about that America. You'll never see it anyway."

Possibly, she and her family will also be needled in some way by the house manager—registration formalities.

Few persons have the moral stamina to resist such browbeating indefinitely. Sooner or later, all but the most steadfast wives have "voluntarily" broken down and filed for divorce. In such cases, the stringent Soviet divorce laws suddenly are relaxed. A process that usually takes many months is completed in a few days. The requirement that both parties must appear before the court is summarily waived.

To crown her humiliation, the wife also is "persuaded" to write a letter to *Pravda* or *Izvestia* publicly repudiating her husband, denouncing his country in the approved manner, and voicing her "wish" to remain in the beloved Soviet homeland.

Things have not gone well with the few girls who stubbornly have clung to their hearts' desire. They are . . .

Soviet wife of a certain American foreign service officer. Having tried but failed to get a Soviet exit visa for her and their small child he had to leave upon termination of his Moscow assignment.

Six months later, the house manager—a profession which, in Russia, includes the duties of police informer—came to the flat she shared with her parents and announced she no longer could be registered there and must move out immediately. When she pleaded that she had nowhere to go, the house manager sneered: "Go to the Americans, they'll look after you."

She was given lodging and a job as housekeeper at an embassy billet. One day a week later, she failed to return from a trip to the market and has not been heard from since. The customary diplomatic representations to the Foreign Ministry have produced the customary silence.

Wives of Americans and Britons are by no means the only victims of the no-exit visa policy. The case of the Soviet wife of the son of the former Chilean ambassador in Moscow was brought before the United Nations. Another case involved the Russian wife of the Greek ambassador. In neither instance did ambassadorial rank carry weight with the visa department.

Soviet wives of American citizens are only a small fraction of those who have made efforts to leave the Soviet Union and get to America. Approximately fifty five hundred applicants have contacted the American Embassy in this connection in the course of the past nine years.

For an ordinary person in the Soviet Union to approach the American Embassy, even during the period of comparative cordiality, required considerable courage and determination. Embassy comings and goings are watched carefully and

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checked by police and plain-clothes men on duty twenty four hours a day outside the embassy. Any "unauthorized" visitor is certain to be marked for observation and possible detention.

Letters to the embassy are sure to be opened and whether or not they are delivered, the MVD is sure to develop a far from friendly interest in the writer.

Accordingly, it is a reasonable assumption that for every application reaching the embassy there were several others who wanted to apply but were afraid or whose letters never were received. If the bars were suddenly lifted, there is no telling how many tens of thousands of Russians would reveal their desire to go most anywhere—but preferably to the United States.

Out of the total named, some two thousand persons filed claims to American citizenship. The remainder put in for immigration visas. As with the wives, the majority of all these applicants came from areas recently annexed by the Soviet Union and under Soviet law became Soviet citizens automatically by fact of residence.

As far as is known, only seventy six out of the thirty five hundred who sought immigration visas have been able to leave the Soviet Union, and of this number forty-one were not claimed as Soviet citizens. Thirty three were given exit visas not to go to the United States but to Poland as being of Polish racial origin under the Polish-Soviet repatriation agreement.

In 1947, in line with the policy change, the lid was clamped down completely. That year, Soviet citizens in this group received exit visas in three instances only. Two cases involved former Americans, widows of prominent Soviet citizens, one of them with two minor children. The third case

that of the minor child of an American citizen, likewise widow of a Soviet citizen.

Since 1947, not one exit visa has been issued to any member of this group, and only one non American citizen was permitted to leave the Soviet Union for America—a Jewish boy whose parents had been killed in a Nazi concentration camp and whose sole relative was an uncle in the United States.

Of the two thousand claimants to American citizenship, about six hundred have been upheld, but only one hundred have been rejected. Save for two hundred and fifty now under decision, the remaining cases have been tabled for lack of information, mostly because the applicants never were heard from again after their initial visit or letter.

Letters sent out by the embassy usually are either unanswered or returned undelivered.

However, it is estimated that there are upward of eighteen hundred persons in the Soviet Union who claim the right to American citizenship, and who wish to return to the United States but cannot obtain Soviet exit visas. The majority of them also are claimed as citizens by the Soviet Union, which does not admit the possibility of dual nationality. Since 1940, only seventeen of these persons have been permitted to leave—and none since 1946.

There also were some persons in the annexed areas whom the Soviets initially recognized as foreign citizens and who therefore were not claimed automatically as Soviet nationals. This was notably the case in former Polish territory and Lithuania, where persons who had lived in the United States and acquired American citizenship, or were born there of Polish or Lithuanian parents, returned for extended visits but returned without American passports.

In the beginning the Soviet authorities respected this status and issued them residence permits as foreigners. Up until 1947, many of these persons were permitted to leave the country. But this group, too, was affected by the change in policy, and in 1948 only three out of more than fifty American citizens, previously recognized as such, were permitted to leave.

Others, when they presented their passports for exit visas, had both their passports and foreigners' residence permits confiscated and were pronounced Soviet citizens. Some times husbands have been granted exit visas as American citizens while their wives and children have been refused permission to accompany or join them.

In all these newly annexed areas before the war a person with a dual nationality claim was free to choose one or the other, although he legally could not hold two citizenships simultaneously. However, considerable latitude of interpretation was allowed. Thus, an individual with a claim to American citizenship might reside locally for years as a citizen of, say, Poland or Lithuania, and then leave the country on an American passport.

The Soviets now appear to consider that the slightest claim to citizenship of any of these countries—even though not exercised—rendered mandatory acquisition of Soviet citizenship at the time of annexation. The individual's preferences are regarded as having no bearing on the case.

The United States foreign service cannot extend even a minimum consular protection to the American citizen involved in these visa hold ups, since the areas they live in are beyond the well marked limits within which diplomats may travel and are deep within the so-called 'Forbidden Zone'.

## No Exit

The most that can be done is for the American Embassy in Moscow to make periodic representations to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—protests which usually are ignored. As for dual nationals, or Soviet citizens, experience teaches that embassy solicitude, far from helping or improving their chances of getting to America, renders them likely candidates for a trip in a different direction.

## XIV

## AFTERMATH OF THE PURGES

THE POWERS and functions of the MVD are not set forth in the Soviet Constitution, that same constitution which describes the rubber stamp Supreme Soviet as the highest law giving body in the land.

The MVD does not feel slighted by this omission. On the contrary, it doubtless would resent any attempt to define its authority, since definition implies limits.

*This deliberate avoidance of any set statutory framework is the clue to the MVD's central position in the Soviet system. It is unfettered, omnipotent police power reduced to practical organizational form—the state in the full sense of Lenin's definition of the state as a machine for suppression.*

The MVD is not a subject the aspiring young Soviet student would be likely to choose for his master's or doctor's thesis. The MVD prefers the light of high wattage incandescent bulbs in shut in places to the light of day. It shuns publicity, and its feelings generally are respected. Consequently, commentaries by Soviet sources on the nature, structure, methods and powers of the MVD are rare.

We, therefore, are all the more indebted to K. P. Gorshenin, Soviet Minister of Justice for a brief but enlightening description of the MVD's origin and early evolution.

In December, 1917, Gorshenin explains, when the Soviet regime was but a few weeks old, a special commission was

established under the chairmanship of Felix Dzerzhinsky. Its purposes, as set forth at the time, were

1. Circumvention and liquidation of all counter revolutionary and sabotaging attempts and actions throughout Russia, regardless of who the authors were

2. Turning over to the court of the military revolutionary tribunal all saboteurs and counter revolutionists and drafting measures for the struggle with these (elements)

This initial decree further imposed specific limitations on the authority of the new organization

The commission conducts only the preliminary investigation and only insofar as required for circumventive purposes

In other words at this early stage, the commission had no power to pass judgment and impose sentences. It simply conducted its investigation and turned its findings over to the court of the revolutionary tribunal. A semblance, at least, of due process of law was thereby preserved

On December 13 (old style), 1917, the Council of People's Commissars officially designated the new body as the All Russian Extraordinary Commission for Struggle with Counter revolution and Sabotage, specifying that it was directly responsible to the Council of People's Commissars. Thereafter the body was commonly known by its Russian initials, VChK, rendered colloquially as Cheka

The first major step expanding the Cheka's original restricted character followed a few months later. Quong Gorshenin

VChK stipulated that after the organization of local Chekas, the right to carry out all arrests, all searches, requisitions, and confiscations connected with counter revolutionary crimes, speculation, crimes of office (presumably graft and dereliction of duty), and through the press (publication of anti-Soviet material), belongs exclusively to organs of the Cheka'

The comprehensive character of this list of functions is self-evident. But this tremendous expansion of its organization and its competency only whetted the Cheka's appetite.

According to Gorshenin "At the end of 1918 the VChK was reorganized from an organ of investigation into an organ that also resorted directly to extra juridical (i.e., without reference to the courts) measures of coercion, assuring swift and, of necessity, cruel repression of the enemies of the Soviet state."

In this candid definition Gorshenin has provided, let us hope for his sake unwittingly, a damaging expose of the fraudulent, phony character of the "rights" and "guarantees" of the individual written into the Soviet Constitution.

The fact that Gorshenin ranks second only to Foreign Minister Andrei Y. Vishinsky among Soviet legal authorities, lends added weight to his words. As head of the Ministry of Justice, which in the past on all too-rare occasions (and even then, only lower local officials were involved) has blown the whistle on the MVD, Gorshenin knows whereof he speaks when he describes its methods as "cruel."

Mr. Gorshenin was dealing with the initial period of the Soviet police state. Since then, the Cheka has been successively renamed GPU, NKVD, and finally MVD. And with





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That is one question I have never heard a Soviet apologist answer.

The great purge began with a bullet in the back of Stalin's heir apparent, Sergei Kirov, in the drafty second floor corridor of Leningrad's Smolny Institute on December 1, 34.

A few days later, sharp-eyed readers of *Izvestia* could see the letters "Stalin" faintly etched onto a published photograph of Kirov lying in state. More than three years afterward, *Izvestia's* chief editor, Nikolai Bukharin, was executed as a self-confessed traitor after the last of the notorious "model" trials.

By then the purge had almost run its course. The number of victims never will be known unless some day the archives of the Soviet Ministry of the Interior are opened to historians. But Russians who did not suffer close personal hurt in the purge are as rare as Russians unaffected by the war.

I recall the case of a German Communist we knew who held a responsible job. One night the NKVD took him away. It was rumored that he had belonged to the Trotskyites. His Russian wife, a long-standing party member, promptly added her own accusations. She cited domestic trivia, such as the circumstance that he always kept one drawer of his desk carefully locked and never permitted her to touch it, as evidence that he had guilty secrets to conceal.

This display of "vigilance" not only allayed suspicion, but so commended her to the favorable notice of the authorities that two years later she was sent to Washington as personal secretary of the Soviet ambassador, a supreme expression of party trust.

She returned to Moscow at the war's end to find that her

extending its activities to other countries, particularly those with important Communist minorities

In 1934, the GPU was transformed into the NKVD or People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, with control over the civil and criminal police concentrated in its hands. Thereafter, even dog licenses were issued by the NKVD.

The great purges of the later thirties saw the widest application by the NKVD of "extra juridical measures of coercion" when thousands of citizens were taken off into the night and never seen nor heard from again, only a tiny few being favored with the travesty of a public "demonstrative" trial.

One of the greatest paradoxes of all time is the fact that H. G. Yagoda, who headed the GPU through its period of greatest expansion, and who for years literally held the lives of Stalin and other Kremlin leaders in the palm of his hand—together with the lives of millions of plain citizens—ended as the victim of the very instrument he had helped to fashion: shot by one of the firing squads he had trained; convicted as a traitor under the same procedure he had devised and used against thousands of others.

Regardless of whether he was guilty or innocent of the charges against him—including the alleged killing of Maxim Gorky and a plan to assassinate Stalin—the implications for the Soviet police state system are equally devastating.

For if he was, as Vishinsky insisted as prosecutor at the 1938 purge trial in which Yagoda figured, a depraved, cold-blooded criminal with a lust for power, then how about the hundreds of thousands dragged off to forced labor camps or shot by GPU firing squads during Yagoda's decade of incumbency?



ex husband (one of her first acts after his arrest had been to secure a divorce), like other German *émigrés* for whom the Kremlin now had use, had been totally exonerated and was earmarked for an important post in eastern Germany. Her offer to go back to him was spurned.

Foreigners who had taken out Soviet citizenship were among those hit hardest by the purge.

Joe Fineberg had given the best years of his life to translating the works of Lenin and Stalin. At the end of 1937 he disappeared. Six months later he was released, looking twenty years older and minus his front teeth. The investigators had "removed" them while trying to determine his guilt or innocence.

Albert Troyer was a citrus fruit specialist from southern Alabama. Soviet talent scouts, looking for someone to help develop varieties of lemons suited to the Black Sea coast, persuaded Mr. Troyer to sign a lucrative *talent* contract—salary in dollars deposited abroad, ruble expenses paid while in the Soviet Union.

When the Troyers reached Sukhumi in the summer of 1932, everything was better even than the contract provided. They had a cozy bungalow on the rim of a turquoise sea. Mr. Troyer's Soviet employers eagerly provided him with every experimental facility he requested. For the first time in his career he could cross and graft lemons to his heart's content. For nearly five years, the Troyers were very happy in their sub-tropical paradise. The lemons grew bigger and better, and Troyer, completely dedicated, had no time or interest left for political developments.

Then, one day in the spring of 1936 his immediate superior at the botanical station told Mr. Troyer an order had

the course of the purge the Kremlin security set up was cleaned out more than once.

Accordingly, in 1939, Stalin brought his fellow Georgian • and old-time comrade Laurenty Beria, to Moscow, to succeed the fanatical, unbalanced Yazhov. Thereafter, he doubtless rested easier.

fied himself as 'This is *Kursant* No So and so' (A *kursant* is a trainee in special security troop officer schools)

My most vivid recollection is that of a young mother Across the years, I still can hear her screams as they took her two month-old baby from her and she and her husband were led off to the 'Black Crow"—Russian equivalent of the 'Black Maria," or police wagon Only three weeks previously her husband had returned from an assignment to Japan with all sorts of lovely presents for his wife and child

The brakes were applied to the tumbrels in the summer of 1938, and soon the purge rolled into reverse Nikolai Yezhov, H G Yagoda's accuser and his successor as head of the NKVD, vanished without trace Minor purge abuses were investigated and denounced The provincial papers were full of proceedings against ogrelike NKVD officials who had rounded up school children as counter revolutionaries By then the Kremlin realized that in its zeal to eliminate possible opponents it had undermined public morale and impaired the country's economic and military strength through the wholesale destruction of intellect and talent

The purge disclosed, among other things, the utter physical dependence of the all powerful Kremlin rulers on their NKVD bodyguard

Stalin and his retinue no longer appeared in public unless all within gunshot had been carefully checked for security The Kremlin itself was an armed camp, bristling with tommy gunners, ever on the alert to repel sudden attack

These extraordinary precautions themselves were a source of gravest danger, for anyone who controlled this praetorian guard might easily have staged a palace revolution

Such intentions, in fact, were imputed to a old, and in

Communist Party Agitation and Propaganda Department. Of recent months, the literary tastes of this body have shaped themselves around the concept of "socialist realism." This may be summarized as a negative attitude toward everything and everyone not pro-Soviet and a positive attitude toward everything Soviet.

Day by day, the requirements grow more didactic. Time was when Soviet writers dealing with the domestic scene felt that the term "realism" in the phrase "socialist realism" entitled them to portray some of the shortcomings, as well as the virtues, of the new society. That time is past!

Not long ago, the State Literary Publishing House was publicly upbraided, among other things, for reprinting *The Twelve Chairs* and *The Golden Calf*, witty masterpieces of that brilliant team of Soviet humorists Ilya Ilf and Yevgeny Petrov. The party no longer was amused by the pranks of their central character, the clever rogue Ostap Bender.

The objection was that by letting Ostap outsmart honest Soviet citizens the authors had "distorted Soviet reality."

Even Alexander Fadeyev, head of the Writers' Union and party stalwart, was ordered by the Propaganda and Agitation Department to revise his novel, *The Young Guard*.

objected to the fact that two underground party leaders in the book bungled and were caught by the Germans, while a Soviet Army general was made out to be a stuffed shirt.

Fadeyev admitted the "justice" of the criticism and promised to make the required changes. One does not argue with the Propaganda and Agitation Department.

"socialist realism," the hero of Soviet



LAST YEAR, Tamary Motyl'ova, leading Soviet female literary critic, was fired from the faculty of the Gorky Institute of World Literature. Promptly thereafter the Ministry of Higher Education revoked the doctor's degree previously conferred upon her.

She was accused of demanding that Soviet literature be critical of its Soviet surroundings and of objecting to 'the best works of Soviet literature' on the ground that they did not do so. Her guilt was compounded by the circumstance that she had once quoted an opinion of 'the filthy traitor Leon Blum'.

Moreover, in her book entitled *German Literature in the Struggle Against Fascism*, she made 'the cosmopolite Lion Feuchtwanger' out as an anti-Fascist. This in itself was enough to brand her as a 'bourgeois cosmopolite' who 'judged works not from the position of high party character but from the position of a cold and indifferent aesthete'.

In plain language, Motyl'ova had committed the unforgivable sin of not using the party line as the supreme criterion of literary criticism.

The party has decreed that the purpose of literature is to advance the cause of communism, and every judge  
of whether a given effort serves this is

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Even Alexander Fadeyev, head of the Writers Union and party stalwart, was ordered by the Propaganda and Agitation Department to revise his novel, *The Young Guard* by far the finest Soviet book to come out of the war. Two years after *The Young Guard* had won the Stalin first prize, the Propaganda and Agitation Department suddenly objected to the fact that two underground party leaders in the book bungled and were caught by the Germans while a Soviet Army general was made out to be a stuffed shirt.

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Under the canons of "socialist realism," the hero of Soviet

literature is and must be 'the new Soviet man' whose prescribed attributes are "moral purity, faithfulness in love and friendship," plus a "passionate feeling of Soviet patriotism." But with all the good will in the world a writer may run into pitfalls if he tries to vary the formula.

In his latest play, *Beke'tov's Career*, rising Soviet playwright Anatoly Sofronov, whose play, *Moscow Character*, earned him a Stalin first prize, tackled the subject of Soviet careerism.

Beke'tov, the villain of the piece, is an unscrupulous and ambitious engineer who frames and blackmails an innocent harvester factory manager in order to get his job.

The hero is Beke'tov's son, a fine, upstanding young Komsomol member, who discovers the foul play by reading his father's mail and, in good Komsomol fashion, turns his parent in to the proper authorities. Enthused the *Literary Gazette* "The play presents questions of Bolshevik morality keenly and correctly. In it are shown the moral purity and clarity and noble inner world of the young Soviet man, for whom the motherland's interest are personal interests."

Sofronov's colleagues thought so, too, and awarded him a playwright's prize. Many theaters busied themselves adding *Beke'tov's Career* to their repertoires.

The Propaganda and Agitation Department thought otherwise, and its organ, *Culture and Life* came out with a scorching denunciation of the play because it concentrated on the character of the careerist, who was held to be far more plausible than the "positive" characters.

*Culture and Life* went on to lash the *Literary Gazette* for its uncritical reviews of *Beke'tov's Career* and of another play, *Fiery River*, by Kozhevnikov.

The *Literary Gazette* editors p

editorially admitted that "unreservedly approving and even enthusiastic articles about these mediocre works" showed "a departure from Bolshevik integrity in the pages of the *Literary Gazette*."

As a rule, it is the older writers who find it hardest to adapt themselves to the literary canons of the Propaganda and Agitation Department.

Before the war, the fiction writer was still comparatively free to follow his fancy provided he did not attack the regime or inject any Soviet twists and nuances.

Some illustrations:

Literature: The brilliant poet Boris Pasternak, after being severely censured for non-conformity, has taken to translating Shakespeare.

Nikolai Pogodin, one of the best prewar Soviet playwrights, who so far has been unable to readjust himself, early this year publicly inveighed against "the compulsion that fatally influences the art of the theater."

By way of illustration, he charged that the director of the Moscow Art Theater—pinnacle of the Russian stage—in choosing a new play for production, reasoned thus: "Surov (the author) is now in favor. He's a party man and obviously knows what it's all about, so we can't go wrong." This, Pogodin said, illustrated the "prevailing cynical indifference."

Pogodin, after severe reprimands, fully recanted. His last play, however, *Missouri Waltz*, purporting to expose the corruption of Kansas City politics, earned him the criticism that his corrupt politicians were more human than his "positive types," the American Communists.

Notwithstanding setbacks, much of what is written

shows promise and talent. Some of the new plays are good entertainment. One of the few prose writers who has adapted himself to the new canon without losing his literary craftsmanship is Konstantin Fedin, whose novel, *Unusual Summer*, won him a Stalin prize this year. Also most readable is Vasilı Azhayev's *Far From Moscow*, another prize winner.

All of these writers fully meet specifications in painting the "new man of the Soviet epochs" in the glowing colors demanded by the party Propaganda and Agitation Department.

At least, they do as of this moment.

## 2

ONE of the genuine cultural achievements of the Soviet regime has been to bring the classics of Russian and world literature to the masses. The great writers of the past, especially the Russian literary giants of the nineteenth century, have been made widely available to the Soviet reading public in cheap editions. Their sales well exceed those of present-day Soviet works.

In performing this service, the authorities go to considerable lengths to establish the claim that the present Communist system is the lineal descendant and end product of the finest cultural and literary traditions of the past—that figures like Pushkin, Lermontov, Tolstoy, and even Byron,



anti American campaign from Pushkin. He quotes the following excerpt: "For some time the North American states have commanded the general attention of thinking people in Europe . . . They saw with astonishment democracy in its most disgusting cynicism, in its cruel prejudice and intolerable tyranny . . . Greed and envy on the part of the voters, timidity and servility on the part of the administrator such is the picture of America recently placed before us."

While Pushkin's role as the founder of modern Russian literature and of the literary Russian language is rightly emphasized, there is a tendency to gloss over his affinity with the West and deny his literary kinship with persons like Keats and Shelley and, especially, Byron.

In like manner, the Soviet regime has taken over the heritage of the great humanitarian and literary critic Vissarion Belinsky, whose short life was consumed battling with the czarist police state on behalf of intellectual freedom. Belinsky stressed the civilizing influence of western European culture on many aspects of Russian life, including literature, which he described as "a tree transplanted to Russian soil from the West." Were he here today, this alone would be enough to brand him a "bourgeois cosmopolite."

Such views are either ignored or discounted. One Soviet writer, without much regard for chronology, explained them away as dating from Belinsky's younger, immature period.

Gogol, who ridiculed the injustices and abuses of his time in his immortal *Dead Souls* and *The Inspector General*, also is acclaimed, even though "he did not see the way to overcome social contradictions." This, translated from party vernacular, means he was not in favor of violent revolution.

Gogol is prized mainly for his patriotism. A recent critic quotes with warm approval a passage wherein Gogol likens

to me, as to the vehicle drawn

The brilliant satirist Saltykov-Schedrin, who mercilessly  
 of the managers and providers of the czarist bureau-

in Soviet bureaucracy

The Soviet claim to the gentle, penetrating Anton Chekhov is argued from the circumstance that his characters, frustrated by the drabness of their provincial lives, frequently prophesy the advent of a better, happier world. The assumption is that the present Soviet order is what Chekhov and his characters were looking forward to. Even the mighty Leo Tolstoy, for all his mythical idealism, has been pruned

Soviet—meaning of the terms. Were they here today, it is hardly likely this would endear them to the Soviet police state.

Academician Tatischev, who has studied the source material, holds that Nicholas I deliberately connived to get rid of

ness."

The thought suggests itself that were they and most of the others here today, the process of liquidation would have been even swifter.

The ~~one~~ <sup>most</sup> Russian writer to whom the Soviet has laid



no claim but has repudiated as hopelessly and irredeemably reactionary is Feodor Dostoevsky. When critic V. Kirponin sought to bring him into line he lost his post on the faculty of the Literary Institute. The *Literary Gazette* charged Kirponin with "attempting to rehabilitate the vicious sworn enemy of the Revolution and democratic revolutionaries, Dostoevsky."

Still, of all literary figures, Dostoevsky would best understand the mentality of the police state. The proceedings of the political treason trials, with their uncanny self accusations, often read just like a Dostoevsky novel. Dostoevsky would have felt far more at home in the present Soviet political temperature than Pushkin, and would have understood it better. Perhaps that is why he is so violently repudiated.

## 3

"WE MUST CREATE for Soviet children works that will unflinchingly expose the beastly countenance of the Anglo-American imperialists, those warmongers, slave traders . . ."

Thus spoke shy mild mannered Sergei Mikhaklov, favorite children's author, to the Eleventh Congress of the Komsomol last spring. By that time, Mikhaklov, like so many other former friends, blushed with embarrassment and pretended not to see us if we chanced to run across him.

A few days after this speech, our son, practically in tears.



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either in the lead or in auxiliary parts. No comedy revue complete without several anti-American numbers.

Constantine Simonov, first to hit the jackpot with an anti-American play (*The Russian Question*), declared in a recent burst of self-criticism that instead of spending so much time on the "split personality" of Hearst reporters he should have concentrated more on "their actual daily anti-Soviet activities."

Certainly as time goes on, the anti-American activities of Soviet writers tend to get rougher.

Roughest anti-American quickie to date is a play by playwright Anatoly Surov titled *The Mad Haberdasher*. The chief character is a haberdashery salesman from Kansas City, Missouri, who has a strong physical resemblance to Hitler. The Pendergast machine politicians hit upon the idea of proclaiming that he is indeed der Fuehrer, secretly saved from the Chancellery bunker, and plugging him for President on an American Nazi platform.

Apparently some of the party Propaganda and Agitation Department giggled over this, for announced openings of the play have been canceled several times.

The party line on America runs thus: The United States is the center of world capitalism and the rallying point of all forces hostile to the Soviet Union, which is the leader of "progressive mankind" in this current period of world wide polarization. The United States Government, which is the agent of American monopoly capital, is intent on achieving world hegemony, and in this connection is planning an aggressive war on the Soviet Union.

As is customary in Communist practice, once the line is formulated, the Propaganda and Agitation Department chooses the facts to support it.

